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THE DILEMMA OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION




Over the last forty years, racial and ethnic minority groups have made
tremendous strides in American politics. The advances were, in large part,
brought about by a series of significant changes in voting-rights law. The
Voting Rights Act of 1965 finally made good on the century-old promise
of the Fifteenth Amendment to ensure minorities access to the polls. The
constitutional reapportionment cases of the 1960s and 1970s brought an
end to the large population disparities between legislative districts that had
preserved rural, white control over an increasingly urban, nonwhite nation.
The right to vote was completely reformulated, and minority voters flocked
to the polls, ushering in a new era in civil rights, a "Second
Reconstruction."
Having secured the right to cast an equally weighted vote, voting
rights advocates-with the support of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
federal agency charged with enforcement of the Voting Rights Act-turned
their attention to fighting more subtle practices designed to dilute minority
voting strength. They attacked practices such as at-large election schemes
and racial gerrymanders using a combination of constitutional and statutory
tools.
The remedy of choice, however, was the creation of majority-minority
districts, districts where members of a minority group constituted an effec-
tive majority and were therefore able to elect representatives of their
choice. State legislatures created a large number of these majority-minority
districts during the round of redistricting following the 1990 census. These
districts resulted in a significant increase in the number of African
American and Hispanic representatives in Congress and in state legisla-
tures. The changing face of our major political institutions began to make it
look as if the promise of equal access and participation was finally being
fulfilled.
But all was not well. There were some curious aspects to this push for
additional majority-minority districts. Republican administrations, along
with the Republican National Committee, vigorously supported the crea-
tion of additional majority-minority districts. This was strange, at least on
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its face, because the newly created majority-black and majority-Hispanic
districts inevitably produced a black or a Hispanic Democrat. The
Republicans' support was not, however, a self-sacrificing move designed
to improve minority political participation. Nor was it an attempt to appeal
to a new constituency. Instead, the explanation came from the nature of
majority-minority districting and the effect it has on surrounding districts.
When a majority-minority district is created, the additional minority
voters must be taken from somewhere, and that somewhere is the surround-
ing districts. This changes the racial composition not only of the new
majority-minority district, but also of the districts that surround it. The
newly created majority-minority district becomes, for example, more heav-
ily black, while the surrounding districts become more heavily white.
Because minority voters tend to vote Democrat, the loss of minority voters
in the surrounding districts is more likely to result in the election of Repub-
licans in those districts-unless, of course, the minority voters are replaced
by white Democrats. Thus, while majority-minority districts reliably in-
crease the number of minority officeholders, they may do so at the cost of
electing candidates in surrounding districts with agendas that are at odds
with minority interests.
Despite a recent shift in sentiment toward the use of coalition districts
(those in which minority voters do not constitute a majority but are none-
theless able to elect candidates of their choice), the tradeoff continues to
occur. This dynamic partially explains the Republican Party's rising for-
tunes during the 1990s. More importantly, it places minority-voting advo-
cates in a real dilemma by forcing them to choose between additional
minority officeholders and additional Democrats, between descriptive rep-
resentation and substantive representation.
Ironically enough, this predicament is caused, in part, by some of the
very Supreme Court rulings that once worked in favor of minority voters:
the malapportionment cases of the 1960s and 1970s that imposed the one
person, one vote requirement on certain state and federal legislative dis-
tricts. That requirement, which mandates that districts be equally populous,
soon became quite popular and, by most accounts, shifted the balance of
power in the country on issues of race and civil rights.' But requiring dis-
tricts to be equally populous makes the creation of majority-minority dis-
tricts a zero-sum game. Concentrating minority voters automatically draws
them away from surrounding districts, which may, in the long run, dilute
their overall influence on the political process. This, along with the geo-
graphically and constitutionally limited number of places to draw such dis-
tricts, has effectively put a lid on minority political participation. African
Americans make up only 9% of the House of Representatives despite
I. See Robert S. Erikson, Reapportionment and Policy: A Further Look at Some Intervening
Variables, 219 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 280 (1973).
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comprising 13% of the population; Hispanics fare even worse, making up
only 5% of the House despite comprising 13.3% of the population. The
numbers are similarly dismal at the state level.
The thesis of this Article is that strict adherence to the one person, one
vote standard, especially in the context of minority-vote-dilution claims, is
nonsensical. The standard itself, even outside the realm of minority voting
rights, has never been adequately theorized. Its greatest advantage, accord-
ing to supporters, is that it is neutral or objective, a point that is, as I and
other commentators have pointed out, patently false.' In sum, it is time for
the Supreme Court to back away from strict adherence to the one person,
one vote principle in minority-vote-dilution cases, eliminating the dilemma
of minority representation and removing the ceiling on minority political
participation.
My argument proceeds in three stages. Part I begins with a brief his-
tory of minority voting rights and then goes on to examine the rise of ma-
jority-minority districts as the remedy of choice in vote-dilution cases.
Much of this Part deals with the theoretical and empirical bases for believ-
ing that such districts involve real tradeoffs in minority representation. Part
II involves a close look at one of the necessary conditions of the represen-
tational dilemma: the one person, one vote standard. The standard, it turns
out, is ultimately based on the same sort of normative considerations that
drive other aspects of voting rights and, as such, can and should be part of
the solution to the dilemma. Finally, Part III lays out such a solution. In
short, I propose relaxing application of the one person, one vote rule in or-
der to shore up minority voting power. I conclude this third Part by an-
swering some of the most obvious objections to such a proposal.
2. Population numbers are from JESSE MCKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 2002 1 (2003), and ROBERTO R. RAMIREZ & G.
PATRICIA DE LA CRUZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
MARCH 2002 at 2 (2003). Congressional statistics are from DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. POLITICAL &
ECON. STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 2000 (2002), available at
http://www.jointcenter.org/whatsnew/beo-2002/beo-map-charts/BEO-00.pdf.
3. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Numbers of African-American Legislators
(2003), at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/afrAmer.htm (last modified Dec. 29, 2003)
(reporting that 8.1% of state legislators are African American); National Conference of State
Legislatures, Latino Legislators (2003), at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/Latino.htm (last
modified Dec. 29, 2003) (reporting that 2.9% of state legislators are Latino).
4. See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV.
213 (2003); RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM
Baker v. Carr TO Bush v. Gore 4-6 (2003).
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THE REPRESENTATION DILEMMA
A. The Battle for Minority Voting Rights
The battle for minority voting rights has taken place on three fronts,
each of which has given rise to a different facet of those rights.5 The first
battle was for access to the ballet box. Access is at the core of the right to
vote and most voting-rights movements in our history were driven by a
desire to secure this aspect of the right.6 But the ability to cast a vote, how-
ever necessary, is not sufficient for meaningful political participation.
Thus, in addition to access, minority voters also need to ensure that their
votes are assigned the same weight as those cast by others in the electorate,
in accordance with the one person, one vote standard. This second aspect
of the right to vote, sometimes referred to as the right to cast a
"quantitatively" undiluted vote, was at the heart of the malapportionment
cases of the early 1960s. The third and final aspect of the right to vote
arose out of a recognition that, in addition to the rights of access and equal
weighting, minority voters could still be denied full participation in the
political system through the use of devices such as at-large districting
schemes and racial gerrymanders. These practices, which "qualitatively"
dilute minority voting strength, are at the heart of most voting-rights juris-
prudence today. But while this ongoing process of achieving equal voting
rights falls into three, fairly neat analytic phases, the actual history is a bit
messier, littered with stops, starts, and periods of complete regression.7 I
will deal with each of these three types of voting rights claims in turn.
5. 1 borrow this basic taxonomy from Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of
Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 176
(1989). She later revised this classification, describing the right to vote as involving participation,
aggregation, and governance. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About
Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-20 (1993). 1 organize this discussion using the earlier
classification because I want to separate out the two principal aspects of "aggregation": the right to a
quantitatively undiluted vote versus the right to a qualitatively undiluted vote. But the addition of
"governance" will certainly be useful later in this discussion, for the dilemma of minority
representation is one that involves a forced tradeoff between aggregation and governance.
6. For a recent discussion of the expansions and contractions in the right to vote and their social,
economic, and political causes, see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000). For a survey of the right to vote early in the
nation's history, see MARCHETTE CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN
AMERICA, 1619 - 1850 (1969); and CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO
DEMOCRACY, 1760 - 1860 (1960). For later developments of the right to vote, with emphasis on
minority voting rights, see BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST
FOR VOTING EQUALITY (1992); J. MORGAN KoUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS:
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880 - I910 (1974);
STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944 - 1969 (1976); and QUIET
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965 - 199o (Chandler
Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
7. See KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at xvii-xxiv.
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1. The Right ofAccess to the Polls
For African Americans, access to the ballot box was initially secured
through the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution-in particular,
the Fifteenth Amendment-and several federal statutes designed to enforce
the new constitutional guarantees.' As a result, large numbers of blacks
voted in the South in the 1870s and 1880s, and black candidates experi-
enced a remarkable degree of Success.9 The postwar flowering of black
political participation, however intense, was short lived. The North's rising
indifference to the plight of black voters was signaled by a series of 1876
Supreme Court cases that gutted the central statutes used to enforce the
guarantees provided by the Fifteenth Amendment.'0 This, coupled with the
withdrawal of military troops from the South under the Compromise of
1877, crippled the ability of Congress to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment." Southern whites responded with a series of escalating meas-
ures designed to keep black voters away from the polls, including force and
ballot-box fraud. 2 By the turn of the century, the Southern white political
leadership closed the book on black participation altogether with a series of
state statutory and constitutional provisions imposing facially neutral de-
vices, such as poll taxes and literacy tests, designed to prevent poor and
illiterate blacks from voting. 3 As a result, black registration and voting in
the South plummeted. In Louisiana alone, the number of registered blacks
dropped from more than 130,000 in 1896 to fewer than 1500 by 1904."4
The level of black political participation remained stagnant until pas-
sage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.15 The Act, which was designed to
enforce the original Fifteenth Amendment guarantees, became one of the
most successful pieces of civil-rights legislation in history. 6 Section 2 of
the Act tracked the language of the Fifteenth Amendment and prohibited
8. For a discussion of the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, see WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE
RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1965); and KEYSSAR,
supra note 6, at 93-104. For some background on the various statutes designed to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment, see KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 106; and GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 5.
Before the Civil War, slaves could not vote, and free blacks were rarely able to meet property-
holding and taxpaying requirements. See KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 55. By the middle of the nineteenth
century, states had abolished most of these requirements but adopted more formal race exclusions. See
id. at 55-59.
9. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 5.
10. The cases included United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), and United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876). See KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 107; GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 6-7.
11. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 7.
12. See id. at 5-6.
13. See KOUSSER, supra note 6; see also KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 111-16; GROFMAN ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 8-10.
14. KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 114-15.
15. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 6; LAWSON, supra note 6, at 10. On the passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, see LAWSON, supra note 6, at 288-328; KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 262-64.
16. See KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 264-65.
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voting qualifications or practices that denied or abridged the right of any
citizen to vote on account of race or color. 7 The Act also contained several
provisions that swept aside many of the facially race-neutral devices used
to keep minority voters from the polls. Section 4 used a neutral formula to
select certain jurisdictions for special treatment.'8 These "covered" juris-
dictions, including most of the worst offenders in the South, were subject
to two principal constraints. First, they were prohibited from using literacy
tests, character tests, or other devices used to discriminate against minority
voters. 9 Second, section 5 of the Act required them to submit any proposed
change in election procedures to the Attorney General or to the federal dis-
trict court for the District of Columbia for "preclearance" before making
the change.2"
The Voting Rights Act had the immediate effect of opening the polls
to blacks and other minority groups.2" In the covered jurisdictions, the per-
centage of eligible blacks registered rose from 29% to over 52%.22 In 1970,
the Act was amended to extend the ban on literacy and character tests na-
tionwide and, in 1975, to extend protection to language minorities. 3 Over
succeeding decades, the level of minority voter participation continued its
upward climb, slowly reducing the gap between minority and white voter
registration.24 This success, though, was limited, because mere access to
the polls guarantees nothing in a representative democracy.
2. The Right to an Equally Weighted Vote: Addressing "Quantitative"
Vote Dilution
The second aspect of the right to vote-the right to cast an equally
weighted vote--developed in the 1960s, around the same time that minor-
ity voters finally secured access to the ballot box. As with access, however,
it was merely the tail end of a much longer story. The idea that representa-
tives should be elected by people casting equally weighted votes was a cen-
tral idea from the country's inception.2 ' Then, for more than half a century,
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2000); see also infra note 53.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
21. See QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 6; LAWSON, supra note 6, at 329-52.
22. See GROFMAN, ET AL., supra note 6, at 22.
23. See KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 265. "Language minorities" include people who are American
Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives or people of Spanish heritage. 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(3)
(2000). The Supreme Court had already recognized Hispanics as a racial minority under the
Constitution. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767-69 (1973).
24. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 22.
25. See GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL
POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 16-22 (1966); ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW
AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 16-29 (1965); Gordon E. Baker, One Person, One Vote:
"Fair and Effective Representation "?, in REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION: LEGISLATIVE
REAPPORTIONMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 71, 72-74 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1968).
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this principle of political equality was discounted by most state legisla-
tures, 26 only to be rediscovered and reapplied in the reapportionment cases
of the 1960s and 1970s.
27
While there was nothing in the original Constitution about equally
weighted votes, there is plenty of evidence that such representation was the
norm at the time the country was founded. There are indications, for exam-
ple, that the framers of the Constitution intended members of the House to
be elected according to such principles. 28 In addition, the original constitu-
tions of many of the first thirteen states, 29 and most of the states subse-
quently admitted to the union,3°  provided for population-based
apportionment for both houses of their legislatures. So while there was no
federal, constitutional acknowledgment of a right to cast an equally
weighted vote (or much else on the voting rights front), the sentiment be-
hind that right was an intrinsic part of many of our political institutions.
The move away from population-based districting began after the
Civil War,3 but really picked up steam in the first half of the twentieth
century. Decade after decade, oftentimes in violation of their own state
constitutions, state legislators refused to redraw district boundaries in the
face of census data showing significant demographic shifts from rural areas
to the cities.32 The movement to the cities was driven, in large part, by the
26. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 24-31; MCKAY, supra note 25, at 49-53.
27. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 728 (1983) (rejecting a New Jersey congressional
districting plan that involved a .6984% maximum deviation); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,
528-29 (1969) (rejecting a Missouri congressional districting plan that involved a 5.97% maximum
deviation); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (applying the one person, one vote requirements to
state legislative districts); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying the one person, one vote
requirements to congressional districts); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (finding differences in
state legislative district sizes to be a justiciable issue).
28. See ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL
REPRESENTATION 6-14 (rev. ed. 1964). The evidence comes from a wide range of sources, including
the Constitution, the Philadelphia Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the state ratifying
conventions. Id.; see also Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-18 (explaining that the historical context of the
constitutional requirement that representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States" demands
use of the equiproportional standard). But see Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 30-39 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the historical record does not support the constitutionalization of the equiproportional
standard).
29. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 20; Baker, supra note 25, at 72-73; see also MCKAY, supra note
25, at 17-19. But see ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN
LAW AND POLITICS 60-64 (1968); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and
Congress: Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REV. 209, 239-42 (1964).
These contrasting views are based upon conflicting interpretations of what it meant for a state
constitution to call for apportionments based predominantly on population. For a discussion of the
issue, see Baker, supra note 25, at 73.
30. See MCKAY, supra note 25, at 16-19, 24-25. From 1790 to 1889, no state was admitted that
did not provide for representation based principally on population. Id. at 24-25.
31. See William J.D. Boyd, Reapportionment: Problems, Prospects, and Probabilities, in
REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION: LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 115, 115 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1968).
32. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 24-31; McKAY, supra note 25, at 49-53.
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migration of rural blacks and the immigration of Europeans.33 As a result,
voters living in the large and growing urban areas, who were dispropor-
tionately members of minority groups, had their votes numerically diluted.
And these voters had little way to redress the problem: state legislators
were not about to redistrict themselves out of power, and the Supreme
Court declared the issue a nonjusticiable political question.34 The numerical
disparities, then, just kept growing.
By the 1960s, when it became apparent that there was no ready solu-
tion to this legislative logjam, the Supreme Court reconsidered the question
and came to a different conclusion, taking its first (and, some would argue,
fatal) step into the political thicket. In 1962, the Court found that the
Tennessee legislature's failure to redistrict in the face of demographic
change gave rise to a justiciable issue under the Fourteenth Amendment.35
The judicial floodgates were now open. The following year, the Court first
declared the basic standard for assessing numerical vote dilution: one per-
son, one vote.3 6 A year later, the Court applied the standard to state legisla-
tive districts37 and congressional districts.38
While the early one person, one vote cases established a numerical
ideal, they did not clearly define the range of permissible variation.39 In
those first few cases, though, the Court signaled that it was heading in dif-
ferent directions on this question with respect to state and federal elections.
In Reynolds v. Sims, the court found that one's right to vote for state legis-
lators was unconstitutionally impaired when "its weight is in a substantial
fashion diluted" as compared to voters in other parts of the state.4° In
Wesberry, by contrast, the Court held that one's vote for federal
33. See C. Herman Pritchett, Representation and the Rule of Equality, in REPRESENTATION AND
MISREPRESENTATION: LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 25 at 1,
3.
34. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
35. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
36. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The conception of political equality from
the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one vote.").
37. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
38. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
39. Variation from the one person, one vote ideal (sometimes called the maximum population
deviation) is calculated for single-member districts using the following steps. First, calculate the ideal
district size by dividing the apportionment base (usually population) by the number of districts. Then,
add the percentage excess of the largest district over the ideal district size to the percentage deficit of
the smallest district under the ideal district size. That sum is the maximum population deviation. This
method is most clearly shown in Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1975).
If, for example, we are dividing a population of 30,000 among three legislative districts, our ideal
district size is 10,000. If the largest and smallest districts actually have a population of 11,500 and
8000, the maximum total deviation is 35% (15% deviation upward plus 20% deviation downward).
40. 377 U.S. at 568. Though the Court later conceded that it may not be possible to draw district
lines with "[m]athematical exactness or precision," id. at 577, better census data and more powerful
computers later made such precision a possibility. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The
Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1654 (1993).
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representatives must, "as nearly as is practicable," be worth that of other
voters.4' The Court later made clear that it would not hold state and local
election districts to the same standard as congressional districts. State and
local districts were allowed to deviate up to 10% without justification42 and
slightly more when suitably justified. 3 Congressional districts, on the other
hand, were increasingly held to a strict standard where almost no deviation
from the ideal district population passed constitutional muster.
4
The one person, one vote standard soon became part of the underlying
structure of federal, state, and local redistricting decisions. The rural, white
minority that controlled state legislatures (and, hence, controlled federal
and state redistricting decisions) was suddenly unable to sit back and allow
the numerical disparities between districts to grow. As a result, in a few,
short years the tremendous inequalities in district populations-inequalities
that had a detrimental effect on minority representation-were eliminated
from the political landscape.45 Minority voters now had the right to cast
ballots and the right to have their votes assigned the same weight as those
of other voters. But while these rights seemed to be necessary prerequisites
to meaningful political participation, they were not sufficient: minority
voters still faced the possibility of having their votes qualitatively diluted.
41. 376 U.S. at 7-8.
42. In Brown v. Thomson, the Court stated:
[M]inor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are
insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment so as to require justification by the State. Our decisions have established, as a
general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10%
falls within this category of minor deviations.
462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Connor v. Finch, 431
U.S. 407, 418 (1977); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973); White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755, 764 (1973). But see Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004) (summarily affirming a district court
ruling that Georgia's state legislative redistricting plan, despite having a maximum deviation of 9.98%,
nonetheless violated the one person, one vote requirement of the Equal Protection Clause).
43. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1973) (upholding a Virginia state redistricting
plan with a maximum deviation of 16.4% on the basis of the state's interest in preserving the integrity
of political subdivision boundary lines), amended by 411 U.S. 922 (1973).
44. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 728 (1983) (rejecting a New Jersey congressional
districting plan that involved a .6984% maximum deviation); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,
528-29 (1969) (rejecting a Missouri districting plan that involved a 5.97% maximum deviation).
45. While the lack of effective minority representation was primarily a result of
disenfranchisement, the lack of numerical voting power also played a role. On the success of the
reapportionment cases in restoring majoritarian rule to our political institutions, see, for example, Lani
Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person, One Vote, in REASON AND
PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 211 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard
Schwartz eds., 1997); Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding
Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 90-94 (1984) (reviewing studies about the impact
of state reapportionment on expenditures in suburban and urban areas, minority representation, and
party strength); and Nathaniel Persily et al., The Complicated Impact of One Person, One Vote on
Political Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299 (2002) (examining the effect of the
reapportionment decisions on various aspects of representation).
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
3. The Right to a Meaningful Vote: Addressing "Qualitative" Vote
Dilution
Even with a guarantee of equally weighted votes, meaningful minority
participation may be thwarted by qualitatively diluting minority votes.
State legislatures have used a variety of schemes to dilute the black and
Hispanic vote, including at-large elections, anti-single-shot laws, reduc-
tions in the size of legislative bodies, racial gerrymandering, and exclusive
slating.46 To take one example, one may gerrymander district lines in sev-
eral different ways to dilute minority voting strength.47 A minority group
that is large enough to constitute a majority in a single-member district
may be "cracked," or divided among various districts such that it is a ma-
jority in none of them.48 Or a minority group sufficiently large to constitute
majorities in two single-member districts may be "packed" into one dis-
trict, so that its members, while they make up a supermajority in that one
district, are able to elect only one representative of their choosing.49 In ei-
ther case, the minority group may be unable to elect a representative of its
choice despite the fact that all of its members had the right to cast an
equally weighted vote.
These tools of qualitative vote dilution were not invented in response
to the gains in black political participation in the 1960s; most had been
used, very effectively, beginning in the nineteenth century. For most of
those years, however, the white majority kept members of minority groups
out of the political process by directly denying their members access to the
polls or numerically diluting their votes. But once those two strategies
were foreclosed by Congress and the Court, the focus shifted to more sub-
tle attempts to qualitatively dilute minority votes. Those who drafted and
interpreted the Voting Rights Act, however, anticipated this response.
The first line of defense against attempts to qualitatively dilute the
black vote came under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act." Section 5 re-
quires the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to "preclear" any proposed changes to "any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting" in certain jurisdictions. 5' The Supreme Court ap-
plied this section to changes that qualitatively diluted voter power as well
46. See, e.g., GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 23-24.
47. See Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORITY
VOTE DILUTION 85, 86-99 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984).
48. See id.
49. See id. The Supreme Court has discussed the strategies of cracking and packing in several
opinions. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.l 1 (1986).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
51. Id.
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as those that disenfranchised minority voters, thus providing a potent
weapon to attack more subtle forms of discrimination. 2
Section 5, however, was limited in a couple of respects. First, it only
applied to a certain number of targeted jurisdictions. 3 Second, it only ap-
plied to changes in voting practices. 4 Thus, dilutive practices that existed
prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act (or before a jurisdiction's in-
clusion in section 5 coverage) were not subject to these requirements. 5
This second limitation, however, did not have much effect when it came to
districting because all redistricting plans involved covered changes.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs were somewhat at the mercy of the preclearance
decisions made by the DOJ. This meant that voting-rights advocates some-
times looked elsewhere for a means of attacking dilutive practices.
Given their success in the one person, one vote cases, the first place
voting-rights advocates turned was to the Constitution. The early malap-
portionment cases generally recognized that vote dilution was actionable
under the Equal Protection Clause 6.5  Though the early cases focused on
claims of quantitative dilution, the cases that followed made clear that
qualitative dilution claims were actionable as well. 7 Many of these cases
targeted the dilutive effect of multimember districts and most were ana-
lyzed under a combination of factors set forth by the Supreme Court and
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.5 ' Those standards changed rather re-
markably, however, in 1980, when the Court decided City of Mobile v.
Bolden. 9
The Bolden Court held that parties alleging qualitative vote dilution
must demonstrate that the challenged practice was established or
52. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (holding that Virginia statutes
changing elections from district to at-large and making certain county positions appointed rather than
elected were subject to section 5 preclearance).
53. Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act describes the covered jurisdictions as those meeting the
following criteria: (1) the jurisdiction maintained a test or device as a precondition for registering or
voting as of November 1, 1964, and (2) less than 50% of the voting-age population was registered to
vote on November 1, 1964, or less than 50% of the voting-age population voted in the November 1964
presidential election. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(b), 1973c (2000). The test was designed to target Southern
states with a history of discrimination and initially covered Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina, Virginia, and parts of North Carolina.
54. § 1973c.
55. Id.; Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 138 (1976) (holding that "[t]he language of § 5
clearly provides that it applies only to proposed changes in voting procedures").
56. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
57. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973) (holding that despite nearly equally
sized districts, multimember voting districts excluded minority participation and thus violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
58. The factors, known as the White/Zimmer factors, came out of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at
765-67, and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305-06 (5th Cir. 1973), affd sub nom. East Carroll
Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
59. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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maintained with discriminatory intent.6' The intent requirement was ap-
plied to suits under either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. And
since the Voting Rights Act was said to add nothing to the constitutional
cause of action, the intent requirement also applied to section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.61 Qualitative vote-dilution claims ground to a halt.
While Congress could do nothing about the Court's new constitutional
position, it did have control over the Voting Rights Act. When the Act
came up for reauthorization the year following Bolden, Congress took that
opportunity to decouple section 2 claims from constitutional claims and
specifically did not require proof of discriminatory intent as part of a sec-
tion 2 claim.62 The Supreme Court issued its first interpretation of the statu-
tory changes a few years later,63 and section 2 became the weapon of
choice in voting-rights litigation.
Thus, even though African Americans and members of other minority
groups had made tremendous strides in securing the right to vote, there was
still some work left to be done. They had greater access to the ballot box.
They had the assurance that a vote cast there would be quantitatively undi-
luted-that is, it would be given the same numeric weight as other ballots.
And, yet, it was still possible that the vote could be qualitatively diluted
such that it could not be combined with votes by other members of the mi-
nority group in ways that allow the group to elect a representative of its
choice. Such dilution was attacked through sections 2 and 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. Those actions, in turn, began to focus on the use of majority-
minority districts as a remedy for qualitative vote dilution.
B. Majority-Minority Districts as a Remedy for "Qualitative"
Vote Dilution
1. The Push for Majority-Minority Districts
When it came to the problem of minority electoral success, there was
a confluence of events that made majority-minority districts the solution of
choice.' The Congressional Black Caucus pushed for such districts in
60. See id. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring). The intent requirement came on the heels of the
Court's similar requirement for more ordinary Equal Protection claims announced in Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976).
61. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60-62.
62. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 1973bb-I (2000).
63. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
64. Majority-minority districts refer, most simply, to political districts in which blacks,
Hispanics, or members of some other racial or ethnic minority constitute a majority. Sometimes the
term is used to refer to when minority members make up a simple arithmetic majority; other times,
because minority registration or turnout rates may be lower, it is used to refer to a district with a
somewhat higher proportion of minorities such that they constitute an effective voting majority. See
Bernard Grofman et al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some
Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383, 1384-85 (2001); Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law
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order to bolster its ranks.65 Civil-rights lawyers and the press put pressure
on state legislatures to create them.6 6 And, looming in the background,
there were the federal and state obligations under the Voting Rights Act.67
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act became an important method of
securing majority-minority districts. Section 5, remember, requires selected
jurisdictions to "preclear" any changes in voting practices through the DOJ
or the federal district court for the District of Columbia. After it became
clear that public officials in some Southern states were ready to resist the
Voting Rights Act not just with changes in voter qualifications, but also
with changes in entire election schemes (such as switching from single-
member to at-large voting schemes), the Supreme Court sanctioned an ex-
panded view of section 5 that captured such changes.68 Over time, the DOJ
became more and more aggressive with the preclearance provisions. By
1995, when the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Johnson, it became ap-
parent that the DOJ was attempting, through its preclearance power, to
greatly increase and even maximize the number of majority-minority dis-
tricts.69
Section 2 lawsuits and the threat of such lawsuits were also a factor in
producing majority-minority districts. In Thornburg v. Gingles, the
Supreme Court's first interpretation of the 1982 amendments to section 2,7o
the Court set out a three-pronged test for assessing when protected minori-
ties have "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to partici-
pate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.''
First, the minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.72 Second, the
minority group must be politically cohesive (that is, there needs to be mi-
nority-bloc voting). 73 Third, the minority must be able to prove that the
Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1527
(2002).
65. See Frank R. Parker, Factual Errors and Chilling Consequences: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno
and Miller v. Johnson, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 527, 528 (1995-96).
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
69. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). The Miller Court made numerous references to the DOJ's
"maximization policy" or "maximization agenda." Id. at 909, 917-18, 921, 925-26. Whether this was
driven by partisan concerns is subject to debate. See Scott E. Blissman, Navigating the Political
Thicket: The Supreme Court, the Department of Justice, and the "Predominant Motive" in District
Apportionment Cases After Miller v. Johnson, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 503, 542-47 (1996) (generally
describing the DOJ's role in promoting majority-minority districts); Bernard Grofman, Would Vince
Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn 't Everything,
It's the Only Thing?," 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1254 (1993) (arguing that the DOJ did not pursue a
partisan agenda in all cases).
70. 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000).
72. 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
73. Id.
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majority votes as a bloc in such a way that it usually defeats the minority's
preferred candidate.74
While the second and third prongs of the test ensure the presence of
actionable vote dilution, the first and second ensure that there is a remedy,
and that remedy is presumptively a majority-minority district. Given the
ubiquity of racial bloc voting," the Gingles test essentially gave rise to a
cause of action wherever there was a sufficiently large minority population
to constitute a majority in a redrawn, single-member district. While the
Gingles test was created in response to vote dilution within a multimember
district,76 it soon was used to attack other single-member districting plans
that did not, in the view of minority plaintiffs, afford them the ability to
fully participate in the political system. And though courts soon moved in
the direction of a multifactored "totality of the circumstances" test in such
cases, Gingles, along with the DOJ's preclearance decisions, resulted in the
creation of many more majority-minority districts in the 1990s.
2. The Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Minority Representation
The new districts had an immediate effect on the electoral success of
minority candidates. The number of African Americans in Congress in-
creased by thirteen in 1992, which was the largest, single-year increase, in
absolute numbers, in U.S. history.77 Those thirteen came from thirteen new
majority-minority districts, all of which elected black candidates in both
the 1992 and 1994 congressional elections.78 Overall, there was a 50% in-
crease in the size of the Congressional Black Caucus and a 38% increase in
the size of the Hispanic Caucus as a result of redistricting after the 1990
census.7 9 The direct effect of majority-minority districting, then, appeared
to be uniformly positive from the vantage point of minority candidates.
The rise in the number of black and Hispanic officeholders was her-
alded as a positive phenomenon both for minority communities and for the
political system as a whole.8" Minority officeholders may be more likely
than their white, liberal counterparts to play leadership roles on initiatives
that help their communities.5 ' White Democrats may vote "the right way"
on community matters, but may be less likely to take the lead.8' The
74. Id.
75. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 134; CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK
INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 209 (1993).
76. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46-51.
77. Richard L. Engstrom, Voting Rights Districts: Debunking the Myths, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS, Apr. 1995, at 24.
78. Id.
79. See Parker, supra note 65, at 529.
80. See SWAIN, supra note 75, at 217 (noting that black descriptive representation may be
valuable in its own right, apart from the values of substantive representation).
81. GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 135.
82. Id.
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majority-minority districts serve as important "ports of entry" for minori-
ties into pluralist politics.83 They are given the benefits of incumbency and
allowed to earn reputations that might bring additional white crossover
support.84 Thus, it is argued, the majority-minority districts, in producing
additional black and Hispanic officeholders, bring benefits to the minori-
ties they represent and to society at large.
There are, however, several drawbacks to using a strategy of majority-
minority districting to improve minority political representation. First,
there are demographic constraints on the use of such districts: there is a
limit to the number of places one can physically and constitutionally draw
additional majority-minority districts. Second, and more importantly, while
majority-minority districts have undoubtedly improved the number of mi-
nority representatives, they may not have had a uniformly positive effect
on the advancement of minority interests. There may be a tradeoff between
descriptive representation (minority officeholders) and substantive repre-
sentation (the advancement of a minority political agenda). The geographic
constraints on majority-minority districts and the tradeoffs they entail are
very real obstacles to increasing minority participation and are part of the
dilemma of minority representation. I will look at each drawback in turn.
3. The Geographic Limits of Majority-Minority Districts
The first drawback to the use of majority-minority districting as a so-
lution to the problem of minority representation is that there are not many
more places to draw such districts.85 The first component of this limitation
is demographic. David Butler and Bruce Cain noted early on that, because
blacks are not only concentrated in Southern cities, but are also dispersed
throughout the rural South, there are "severe limits on the degree to which
affirmative action gerrymandering... will actually remedy minority
underrepresentation in a significant way."8 6 In the round of redistricting
following the 1990 census, majority-minority districts were drawn just
about everywhere possible in the South.87
83. Id. at 135-37. Indeed, this became an important factor in the coalition districts that were
formed after many of the original majority-minority districts were struck down as unconstitutional.
84. Id. at 135-37; David T. Canon et al., The Supply Side of Congressional Redistricting: Race
and Strategic Politicians, 1972 - 1992, 58 J. POL. 846, 859-60 (1996) (arguing that in new majority-
minority districts bi-racial coalitions arise to elect black candidates).
85. See DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 14-15 (1992); GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 135; SWAIN, supra note
75, at 200-01; Kevin A. Hill, Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans? An
Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern States, 57 J. POL. 384, 386 (1995);
David Ian Lublin, Race, Representation, and Redistricting, in CLASSIFYING BY RACE 111, 113 (Paul E.
Peterson ed., 1995).
86. BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 85, at 14-15.
87. See Lublin, supra note 85, at 113.
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A second component is constitutional. Under current Supreme Court
precedent, race may not be the predominant factor in districting."8 And
many of the districts created in the 1990s were subsequently struck down
under Shaw and Miller.9 This new constitutional regime rules out the type
of extreme gerrymanders that might make additional majority-minority
districts possible.
These limits also apply with somewhat less force to so-called
"coalition" districts.9 After courts struck down many of the majority-
minority districts in the South under Shaw in the mid- to late-1990s, it be-
came clear that majority-minority districts may not be necessary to elect
minority candidates.9 In districts where minorities make up a substantial
part of the population, but not a majority, minority voters may combine
with white crossover voters to elect a minority candidate. 92 However, many
of the same geographic and constitutional limitations apply to the creation
of coalition districts. The geographic distribution of blacks and Hispanics
that limits the number of majority-minority districts also limits the number
of coalition districts. Further, if race is the predominant factor used to draw
coalition districts, such districts may be struck down under Shaw and
Miller regardless of whether they are 50%, 40%, or even 30% minority. 93
In addition, scholars who have looked closely at coalition districts have
made clear that there are many factors involved in building successful coa-
lition districts; they do not carry with them the same guarantee of meaning-
ful minority representation. 94 Thus, there are somewhat limited prospects
for improving minority representation by creating either majority-minority
or coalition districts.
88. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding that districts may violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution if race was the predominant factor in their creation); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that irregularly shaped districts can, on their face, violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution).
89. For example, nine of the thirteen majority-minority congressional districts created after the
1990 census were invalidated in the latter half of the decade. See Note, The Future of Majority-
Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially Polarized Voting, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2208, 2214 n.39
(2003) (listing majority-minority districts struck down by the Supreme Court and district courts).
90. Richard Pildes has the most useful definition of a coalition district as "a district with a
significant presence, though not a majority, of black voters, but that has a fifty-fifty probability of
electing the preferred candidate of those black voters." Pildes, supra note 64, at 1539-40. He
distinguishes coalition districts from influence districts, in which the black voters have significant, but
not determinative, influence on the selection of the candidate. Id.
91. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Charles S. Bullock, III & Richard E. Dunn,
The Demise of Racial Districting and the Future of Black Representation, 48 EMORY L.J. 1209 (1999);
Grofman et al., supra note 64; Pildes, supra note 64.
92. See Bullock & Dunn, supra note 91; Grofman et al., supra note 64.
93. See Pildes, supra note 64, at 1547-48. See also Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001)
(noting that the restrictions on using race as a predominant factor in districting decisions apply to
majority-minority districts and "the approximate equivalent").
94. See Grofman et al., supra note 64, at 1411, 1423-24 (noting the importance of a variety of
factors that affect whether minority voters in a district will, in fact, be able to elect a candidate of their
choice, including the race of the incumbent and the racial and partisan balance in the district).
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4. The Tradeoff Between Descriptive and Substantive Representation
A more troubling drawback to majority-minority districts is that they
may actually hinder the advancement of minority interests in a legislature.
In order to create majority-minority districts, minority voters are siphoned
off from surrounding districts, changing the racial composition of both: the
movement of black voters into the former "bleaches," in effect, the racial
composition of the latter.95 These adjoining districts may then be more
likely to elect representatives with political agendas that are less sympa-
thetic to minority interests. The net result of majority-minority districting,
then, may actually be harmful to minority political interests.
A simplified example illustrates the potential dilemma. 96 District A
and District B each have 100,000 voters composed of 35,000 black voters
and 65,000 white voters. The voting in both districts is racially polarized.
The black voters support Democrats over Republicans at a rate of 90% to
10%; the white voters support Republicans over Democrats at a rate of
60% to 40%. This means that in each district there are 57,500 Democrats
(90% of the 35,000 black voters (31,500) plus 40% of the 65,000 white
voters (26,000)) and 42,500 Republicans (10% of the 35,000 black voters
(3500) plus 60% of the 65,000 white voters (39,000)). As a result, both
District A and District B send a white Democrat to the legislature.
District lines are then redrawn in order to create a majority-minority
district. As a result, District A is drawn to include 55,000 black voters and
45,000 white voters. This leaves District B with 15,000 black voters and
85,000 white voters. The change, as intended, has left the black voters in
District A in position to elect a representative of their choice, a black
Democrat, by a margin of 67,500 (90% of 55,000 black voters (49,500)
plus 40% of 45,000 white voters (18,000)) to 32,500. The Democrats,
however, are now going to take a beating in District B where Republicans
outnumber Democrats by 52,500 (10% of the 15,000 black voters (1500)
plus 60% of the 85,000 white voters (51,000)) to 47,500. As a result,
95. Karlan refers to this as the "bleaching critique" of the Voting Rights Act. Pamela S. Karlan,
Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VANo. L. REV. 291, 293 (1997). She
argues, quite persuasively, that the critique oversimplifies the relationship between majority-minority
districting and overall minority influence. See id. Of course, I am not using bleaching theory to critique
the creation of majority-minority districts or the Voting Rights Act that produces them; instead, I use it
to challenge the one person, one vote standard, which I think is at least partially responsible for the
tradeoff between minority gains and Democratic losses. But my argument does depend, in part, on the
fact that the straightforward numerical shuffling of white and African American voters is at least a
partial explanation for the tradeoff.
96. The example, though greatly simplified, uses numbers that at least echo those accompanying
the creation of majority-minority districts in the South. The example greatly simplifies some things,
like the number of adjoining districts that are affected by creation of a majority-minority district. It also
does not take into account other factors, like possible changes in voting behavior caused by being
placed in a district with a different racial composition. For a more detailed explanation of the effects of
majority-minority districts, see Karlan, supra note 95.
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District A sends a black Democrat and District B sends a white Republican
to the legislature. The decision whether to support the creation of the
majority-minority district turns on whether one prefers two white
Democrats to one black Democrat and one white Republican. And that may
depend on whether one is a Democrat or a Republican and whether one is
black or white.
These potential shortcomings to the one person, one vote standard
were not completely overlooked at the time of its creation. Though many
opponents of the standard criticized it because it prevented states from al-
locating power among groups with distinct interests, a few of them noticed
that those interests may be described in terms of race as well as region. For
example, in the wake of Baker v. Carr, Alexander Bickel asked, "Is it
irrational or otherwise forbidden so to gerrymander districts that a solid
Negro or Puerto Rican vote is ensured, thus making certain that legislative
bodies will contain members of these minority groups?"97 Years later, with
the equiproportional mandate firmly embedded in the Constitution, he con-
sidered his question answered: "The one man, one vote rule necessarily
deprives discrete groupings and interests, regional, racial, and other, of di-
rect representation."9 Bickel may not have anticipated the precise tradeoff
discussed here, but he did foresee that the one person, one vote standard
restrained the government's ability to allocate political power to racial mi-
norities for more benign reasons.
In any case, this theoretical problem concerning the potential side ef-
fects of majority-minority districting resolves into at least two distinct and
largely empirical questions. First, do majority-minority districts have the
effect of contributing to the political success of candidates with interests
antithetical to minority interests? In practical terms, this means examining
whether majority-minority districting advantages white Republicans over
white Democrats in adjoining districts. Second, if majority-minority dis-
tricting does help Republican candidates, does the benefit of having a mi-
nority representative offset the potential disadvantage of additional
Republican representatives in the legislature? To put it more bluntly, are
blacks' interests better served by a few black Democrats or more white
97. Alexander M. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 43 (1962).
Those who supported Baker also understood that it would limit a state's ability to numerically
concentrate the voting power of racial groups; they just did not think that was a problem. As Robert
McKay argued:
[T]here does not appear to be justification for special recognition in weighted votes to
economic or ethnic interests. Neither labor nor management, neither dairy farming nor
shipping, neither racial nor religious minorities should be entitled as such to a weighted voice
in the legislative forum. To do so is to tilt the democratic process dangerously and
impermissibly.
Robert B. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61
MICH. L. REV. 645, 696-97 (1963).
98. Alexander M. Bickel, The New Supreme Court: Prospects and Problems, 45 TUL. L. REV.
229, 242 (1971).
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Democrats? If majority-minority districting really does advantage minority
candidates only at the cost of losing Democrats in the legislature, minority
political strategists are currently forced to make this political choice.
The first question, about the effect of majority-minority districts on
the political fortunes of Republicans, may be examined from several an-
gles. For example, if Republicans are advantaged, we should see a couple
of things happening with respect to majority-minority districts.99 First, and
most directly, majority-minority districts should have the perverse effect of
increasing the number of Republicans and decreasing the number of
Democrats in the legislature. Second, there should be a somewhat unortho-
dox political alliance formed between civil-rights groups and Republicans
pushing for such districts.
i. Majority-Minority Districts Benefit the Republican Party: Theoretical
and Empirical Evidence
There was strong evidence that majority-minority districts would help
Republicans even before much majority-minority districting had been
done. Several authors discussed the theoretical likelihood that concentra-
tion gerrymandering would have a perverse effect upon the representation
of the concentrated group's political agenda.' Others made more pointed
predictions that majority-minority districts would lead to the defeat of
white Democrats by white Republicans and thus produce more conserva-
tive legislative majorities.'' One early study of South Carolina redistricting
plans found a significant correlation between the number of majority-
minority districts and the expected number of Republicans elected. 2 The
theoretical models, then, seem to predict that racial gerrymandering ends
up helping Republicans.
Such predictions have also been supported by a range of empirical
studies. A large number of studies examine the effect of majority-minority
districts on the 1992 and 1994 congressional elections.0 3 Bob Benenson
argued, on the heels of the 1992 election, that three white Democratic
99. See Kenneth W. Shorts, The Effect of Majority-Minority Mandates on Partisan
Gerrymandering, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 120 (2001). Shotts writes of a third effect, that such districts will
decrease substantive representation of minority voters' interests. Id. at 120. I deal with this effect later
in the Article as part of my second empirical question.
100. See, e.g., BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 166-71 (1984); Robert S.
Erikson, Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections, 66 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 1234 (1972).
101. See, e.g., DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION 119 (1997); SWAIN, supra note
75 at 205-06; ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS 234 (1987).
102. See Kimball Brace et al., Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help
Republicans?, 49 J. POL. 69 (1987).
103. For some brief discussions of those studies, see DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING,
AND REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS 74 (1999);
and Shotts, supra note 99, at 120.
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incumbents lost to Republicans as a result of racial redistricting.'0 4 Kevin
Hill later put the number at four.0 5 Carol Swain's number is five, 10 6 and
David Lublin maintains that five or six white Democrats were defeated as a
result of racial redistricting.0 7 When the 1992 and 1994 elections are taken
as a group, Lublin argues, the number rises to eleven. 1 8 Some scholars
have also looked at the effect of racial redistricting on state legislative elec-
tions and found a similar rise in Republican fortunes. 109 So, while there is
some disagreement as to the exact extent of the impact, the empirical evi-
dence appears to support the point that racial gerrymandering of this sort
advantages Republicans over Democrats."'
The claim that racial gerrymandering leads to Republican gains at the
expense of Democrats is not uncontroversial. Some commentators, after
looking at most of the studies discussed above as well as others, concluded
that "[t]he true electoral effect of racial redistricting remains unclear.""'
There are both theoretical and empirical reasons for the lack of clarity on
the question. Some scholars have argued that majority-minority districts do
not necessarily lead to Republican gains." 2 Instead, such a relationship
depends upon several other factors, such as whether the majority-minority
districts are really supermajority districts,"3 whether there is Republican
104. See Bob Benenson, Redistricting: GOP's Dreams of a Comeback via the New Map Dissolve,
50 CONG. Q. WKLY. 3580-81 (1992).
105. See Hill, supra note 85, at 399. Hill also found that other factors helped Republicans in the
1992 elections. By his tally, seventeen Republican districts became less competitive and eleven
Democratic districts became more competitive as a result of majority-minority districting. Id. at 387.
106. See Carol M. Swain, The Future of Black Representation, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1995, at 78.
107. Lublin, supra note 85, at 112.
108. Lublin, supra note 85, at 114; David Lublin & D. Stephen Voss, The Partisan Impact of
Voting Rights Law: A Reply to Pamela S. Karlan, 50 STAN. L. REV. 765, 772 (1998).
109. See Lisa Handley et al., Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office: The
Relationship Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred
Candidates, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S 11, 38 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998) (finding
that Democratic losses in the first round of redistricting after the 1990 census was probably the result of
an increase in the number of overwhelmingly white districts); David Lublin & D. Stephen Voss, Racial
Redistricting and Realignment in Southern State Legislatures, 44 AM. J. POL. Sci. 792 (2000)
(examining all state legislative elections in the South from 1990 to 1998 and finding that racial
redistricting harmed Democrats in every state and cost them control of at least two state houses). The
importance of state legislative elections should not be underestimated. State legislatures, in addition to
making important policy decisions that affect minority interests, are also in charge of congressional
redistricting, and thus may play an important role in determining the effect of majority-minority
congressional districts on adjoining districts.
110. In addition to those scholars already cited, see also STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL
THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE 483 (1997); Charles S. Bullock, Affirmative Action
Districts: In Whose Faces Will They Blow Up?, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Apr. 1995, at 22.
111. Lublin & Voss, supra note 109, at 792.
112. See Engstrom, supra note 77, at 24; Grofman, supra note 69, at 1251-52; John R. Petrocik &
Scott W. Desposato, The Partisan Consequences of Majority-Minority Redistricting in the South, 1992
and 1994, 60 J. POL. 613, 629-30 (1998); Shotts, supra note 99, at 130-3 1.
113. See Shotts, supra note 99, at 130-31.
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strength close to the majority-minority districts," 4 and who does the
redistricting-Republicans or Democrats." 5 Indeed, this final factor seems
to be very important, as a Democratically controlled state legislature can
often draw majority-minority districts in such a way that does not affect the
status of Democratic incumbents in surrounding districts. In addition, while
some acknowledge that racial gerrymandering played a role in the 1992
and 1994 congressional elections, it may be that the general realignment
toward the Republicans played an even greater role in Democratic losses." 6
The same may be said for Democratic losses in state legislatures as well." 7
But this is not to say that majority-minority districting did not, overall,
help Republicans in both federal and state races. To be sure, there was an
important surge as white voters increasingly voted Republican, and there
were instances where Democratic state legislatures were able to draw
majority-minority districts in ways that preserved Democratic seats. But,
these issues aside, the weight of the evidence supports the proposition that
such districts did help Republicans on both the federal and state levels in
the 1990s. Thus, majority-minority districts do seem to have the perverse
effect of increasing the number of Republicans and decreasing the number
of Democrats in the legislature.
Now we turn to the related question of whether civil-rights groups and
Republicans formed a relatively unorthodox political alliance in pushing
for such districts. Republicans might push for majority-minority districts
for several reasons. Most obviously, if such districts actually benefit their
party on a larger scale, it is in their interest to have more of them."8
Moreover, minority candidates coming out of majority-minority districts
are likely to be well to the left of the political mainstream, thus taking the
Democratic party further from the center." 9 This may also have the effect
of splitting the Democratic party. 2° And, finally, to the extent that
majority-minority districts reinforce race-related voting, and Republicans
114. See Brace et al., supra note 102, at 183; Grofman, supra note 69, at 1251-52.
115. See Brace et al., supra note 102, at 183; Grofman, supra note 69, at 1251-52; Shotts, supra
note 99, at 130-31.
116. See Engstrom, supra note 77, at 24 (arguing that Republican gained seats in the nine southern
states with new majority-minority districts at the same rate as they gained seats in the other forty-one
states); Lani Guinier, Don't Scapegoat the Gerrymander, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at
36 (listing several other reasons for Democratic losses in the 1994 congressional elections and arguing
that losses in the South were no greater than elsewhere); Karlan, supra note 95, at 304-07 (1997)
(noting that there was a longtime drop of the Democratic share of the white vote in the South); Petrocik
& Desposato, supra note 112, at 630 (arguing that the shift in political tides to the Republican party
was the necessary ingredient in Democratic congressional losses).
117. See Lublin & Voss, supra note 108, at 801-03 (arguing that while racial redistricting cost the
Democrats at the state legislative level, Republican realignment had a greater impact).
118. See SWAIN, supra note 75, at 205; Paul E. Peterson, A Politically Correct Solution to Racial
Classification, in CLASSIFYING BY RACE 3, 1I (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1995).
119. See Peterson, supra note 118, at 12.
120. See id. at 13.
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benefit from racial conflict, that might also help their party.'2 ' Thus, one
might expect Republicans, though they may philosophically oppose
majority-minority districts as affirmative action for black politicians, to
work behind the scenes to support such districts. Conversely, one might
expect Democrats to support the districts in theory but work to undermine
them. 2 And that appears to be exactly what happens.
There was sometimes tacit, sometimes overt, collusion between repre-
sentatives of the minority community and Republicans to maximize
majority-minority districts. 123 In the early 1990s, the Republican National
Committee pushed for more black and Hispanic districts as part of a strat-
egy to win additional seats in the House. 24 The Committee also made a
concerted effort to win control of state legislatures using the same strat-
egy. "'25 Some critics claimed that the DOJ was enforcing the Voting Rights
Act as part of a Republican conspiracy to "whiten" surrounding districts,
but there does not seem to be any evidence of illegitimate influence. 126 That
is, there does not seem to be evidence that the Republican party manipu-
lated the DOJ's preclearance decisions or other litigation decisions in order
to win additional seats. Indeed, they did not need to-the party usually
benefited from the DOJ's routine enforcement of the Act.
Democrats were not immune from this sort of hypocrisy. In many
cases, they would seek to reduce the number of majority-minority districts.
In Georgia, for example, Democrats sought to reduce the number of safe
minority districts in the state senate in order to improve the party's overall
chances. 27 Democrats did something similar in New Jersey.2 2 Thus both
parties act as though there is a very real political tradeoff to be made in the
case of majority-minority districts.2 9
In sum, there is strong evidence that Republicans are advantaged by
the creation of majority-minority districts. There is evidence that such dis-
tricts contributed to some of the Republican gains on the federal and state
level in the 1990s. The Republican Party, despite its philosophical objec-
tions to racial redistricting, clearly thought there was something to be
gained by it. And Democrats, despite being generally favorable toward im-
proving black representation, sought to undermine the creation of
121. See id. at 12-13.
122. See Canon et al., supra note 84, at 848 n.4.
123. Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black
Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 794, 810 (1996).
124. See SWAIN, supra note 75, at 205; Peterson, supra note 118, at 10-11.
125. Grofman, supra note 69, at 1249-51.
126. See id. at 1253-56.
127. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
128. See Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2001).
129. For a brief discussion of this phenomena, see Nathaniel Persily, Suing the Government in
Hopes of Controlling It: The Evolving Justifications for Judicial Involvement in Politics, 5 U. PA. J.
CoNsT. L. 607, 610-11 (2003).
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additional majority-minority districts. So, given that additional minority
representatives come at the cost of a shift from Democratic to Republican
representatives, the question remains: Are majority-minority districts, in
the end, a net advantage or disadvantage in the quest for meaningful minor-
ity representation?
The answer to this question may turn on what one means by
"representation." It is useful here to look at Hannah Pitkin's analysis of the
term.'3° Pitkin distinguishes descriptive representation from substantive
representation.' Descriptive representation occurs when there is a corre-
spondence between the representatives' characteristics and those of their
constituents.32 In this case, that would mean that a black officeholder de-
scriptively represents black constituents. But, as Bernard Grofman notes,
"Being typical may be roughly synonymous with being representative, but
it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for being an effective
representative."' 33 By "effective" representation, Grofinan means substan-
tive representation, which occurs when there is a correspondence of the
representatives' goals with the goals of their constituents. 134
ii. The Tradeoff Between Descriptive and Substantive Representation
Once we are clear on what we mean by representation, the dilemma
can be recast. Majority-minority districts certainly increase descriptive rep-
resentation: the addition of majority-black districts results in a net increase
in the number of black representatives in the legislature. If the advance-
ment of minority interests can be measured by the number of minority of-
ficeholders, then majority-minority districts have been successful in
increasing minority representation. The issue, however, is whether such
districts, by helping Republicans in remaining districts, actually have the
overall effect of decreasing substantive representation. Even though there
may be more black Democrats, there may be fewer Democrats overall,
leading to the question of whether majority-minority districting represents
a tradeoff between descriptive and substantive representation.'35
130. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967). Pitkin's distinction is
also discussed in this context by SWAIN, supra note 75, at 5-13.
131. PITKIN, supra note 130, at 60-91, 114. The distinction was recently embraced by the Supreme
Court as part of their reasoning in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
132. See PITKI N, supra note 130, at 60-9 1.
133. Bernard Grofman, Should Representatives Be Typical of Their Constituents?, in
REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 97, 99 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982).
134. Id. at 98.
135. See Cameron et al., supra note 123, at 794. The tradeoff can also be described as a tradeoff
between control and influence, or between control of a district and control of a legislature (thanks to
Nate Persily on this point). Or, to rephrase in terms of Pamela Karlan's newer taxonomy of voting
rights, it involves a tradeoff between aggregation and governance. See Karlan, The Rights to Vote,
supra note 5, at 1709-20. Regardless of how it is described, however, this tradeoff is ultimately
unavoidable.
2004] 1613
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
The question of this potential tradeoff, in turn, depends upon whether
the loss of white Democrats matters to black political interests. Most
scholars seem to think that it does. Although there are many different ways
of rating a representative's support of black interests, most scholars ana-
lyze votes on civil rights and redistributive social-welfare programs.
136
Unsurprisingly, Democrats are almost always more supportive of such
measures than Republicans,' 37 which seems to indicate that an overall loss
of white Democrats matters to black political interests. 13 8 Removing minor-
ity voters from the districts surrounding a new majority-minority district
may also affect how sympathetic white incumbents are to black interests.
For example, one study found that white incumbents who lost black voters
during redistricting for the 1992 election cycle became less sensitive to
black concerns.' So, at some level, majority-minority districting does en-
tail a tradeoff between descriptive and substantive representation.
This tradeoff forces advocates for minority representation to make a
choice between descriptive and substantive representation. That is not to
say that the two never go hand in hand. Minority officeholders almost al-
ways vote in favor of legislation important to minority interests. Thus, the
question remains whether the benefit of having a minority representative
offsets the potential disadvantage of additional Republican representatives
in the legislature. Are black interests better served by a few black
Democrats or more white Democrats? There is evidence, for example, that
while white Democrats vote in favor of legislation of importance to the
African American community, they are less likely than black officeholders
to take the lead and initiate such legislation. 4 ' But this question is not di-
rectly relevant to our inquiry, for so long as majority-minority districting
involves some representational costs, minority-voting-rights advocates are
forced to make a choice.
136. Figuring out what blacks' interests are is somewhat difficult. Carol Swain divides them into
objective and subjective interests. See SWAIN, supra note 75, at 6. Objective interests are those based
on observable phenomena, such as income, employment status, educational opportunity, and health
care. See id. at 7-10. Subjective interests are based on the group's perception of its interest, and, while
often related to objective interests, does not have to be identical to them See id. at 6, 10-11. She also
takes into account the position of organized interest groups, such as the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, the National Urban League, and the Congressional Black Caucus. See
id. at 11-13.
137. See id. at 13-19 (analyzing congressional support of black interests based on scales devised
by the Committee on Political Education, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and herself).
138. See id. at 15, 19.
139. See L. Marvin Overby & Kenneth M. Cosgrove, Unintended Consequences? Racial
Redistricting and the Representation of Minority Interests, 58 J. POL. 540 (1996).
140. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Heart and Phase Transitions: An Exploratory Study of
Congress and Minority Interests, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1729 (1997).
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iii. Principles that Limit the Effectiveness of Majority-Minority Districts
Why, exactly, are minority-voting-rights advocates forced to make
such a choice? In other words, what are the conditions that make such a
choice necessary? Some are related to the enduring existence of racial bloc
voting. Some are the result of the majoritarian structure of most of our de-
mocratic institutions. And some may be the result of existing voting rights
law. I will take an example of each of these conditions in turn.
One reason why majority-minority districts force such a choice, and
why many suggest that majority-minority districts are a solution to the lack
of descriptive representation, is the presence of racial bloc voting. Black
voters overwhelmingly vote Democratic and vote for black Democrats
when given a choice; white voters, in increasing numbers, vote Republican
and vote for white Republicans.'41 There is a deep and widening racial di-
vide in America with regard to public opinion on a broad range of issues.'42
And despite some views to the contrary,'43 redistricting, and even voting
rights law generally, have very little effect on this state of affairs.' Even
the advent of successful coalition districts-and the possibility that they
signal a decline in racial bloc voting-does nothing to eliminate the repre-
sentation tradeoff.'45 So while one could try to avoid the choice by elimi-
nating racial bloc voting, voting rights law is not a very good tool for such
141. See Grofman et a]., supra note 64, at 1400-01. Indeed, in the history of the United States,
only six black candidates have won elections in districts with white, non-Hispanic majorities. See
Peterson, supra note 118, at 112. And most black candidates who have won in white congressional
districts did so under peculiar circumstances. See David Lublin, Racial Redistricting and African-
American Representation. A Critique of "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black
Representation in Congress?, " 93 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 183, 184 (1999).
142. See DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 33-34 (1996). Some commentators have recently noted that majority-minority
districts may not be as necessary in part because racial bloc voting is declining. See, e.g., Pildes, supra
note 64, at 1529-39; Note, supra note 89, at 2219. But it is unclear whether racial bloc voting is
actually declining or whether social scientists in the 1980s and early 1990s overestimated the
percentage of minorities necessary to elect a candidate of their choice. See Pildes, supra note 64, at
1532 n.39. In any case, I think it is safe to say that there is still a large racial divide on issues and that
racial bloc voting, though it may be declining in some regions, remains significant.
143. The Themstroms have been particularly adamant on this point. See, e.g., THERNSTROM &
THERNSTROM, supra note I 10, at 489-92 (arguing that using race to draw district lines perpetuates
racial division); THERNSTROM, supra note 101, at 237-38; Abigail Themstrom, "Voting Rights" Trap,
NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 1985, at 21, 23 (1985). The Supreme Court put forth this theory when Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno likened such districting to "political apartheid." 509 U.S.
630, 647 (1993). Justice O'Connor continued:
It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group--regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls .... By perpetuating such
notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that
majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. Id. at 647-48.
144. See Parker, supra note 47, at 533.
145. See Note, supra note 89, at 2228.
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a change. And, in any case, if one could eliminate racial bloc voting, one
would not need majority-minority districts to begin with.
Some of the conditions for the choice come out of the basic structure
of our winner-take-all, majoritarian democracy. For this reason, advocates
like Lani Guinier have proposed positional voting systems like cumulative
voting to get around the problem.'46 In such a system, minority voters are
able, by bullet voting in the case of cumulative voting, to ensure that the
representative of their choice is elected. 47 It is an elegant solution to the
problem,'48 but one that, thus far, has not caught on despite some sporadic
local experimentation. Thus, the desire to maintain a majoritarian as op-
posed to a proportional election structure forces the tradeoff and the choice
to be made.
Finally, voting-rights law poses some of the constraints that are re-
sponsible for the representation dilemma facing minority-voting-rights ad-
vocates. The Shaw line of cases, for example, places an upper constraint on
the number of majority-minority districts that may be constitutionally
drawn.'49 Freed from Shaw's prohibitions, voting-rights advocates might be
able to squeeze a few more districts out of the next round of redistricting.
But the advocates' success would be limited by another constitutional re-
quirement, the one person, one vote rule, which plays an even more sig-
nificant role in forcing minority voters to choose between descriptive and
substantive representation.
Throughout this discussion, we have been (correctly) assuming that
the voting districts we are talking about are required to have equal popula-
tions. The Supreme Court has read Article I to require congressional dis-
tricts within the same state to have almost perfectly equal populations. 5 °
State and local districts get a little more leeway but are generally expected
to have no more than a 10% maximum deviation, 5' a few percentage
points more if suitably justified.' These constitutional rules make the
creation of majority-minority districts a zero-sum game: increasing the
percentage of minority voters in one district inevitably means reducing it in
another. The one person, one vote requirements are a necessary element in
the representational dilemma faced by advocates of minority voting rights.
146. Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member
Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1156 (1993).
147. More specifically, in a cumulative voting system, each voter is allotted as many votes as there
are open seats. Voters may distribute their votes as they see fit, either clumping their votes for one
candidate, called bullet voting, or dispersing their votes among several candidates. The candidates
receiving the most votes win.
148. Its elegance stems from, among other things, the fact that voters place or organize themselves
into groups, instead of being placed into a group by those drawing district lines.
149. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
150. See supra note 44.
151. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps, then, we should examine those requirements a little more closely,
with an eye to improving the lot of minority voters.
II
THE ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE STANDARD
A. The Popular, "Objective" Standard
On its face, the one person, one vote standard has a lot going for it. It
is a catchy slogan, phrased in a way that makes opposition seem ridiculous.
Who, for example, would advocate something like one person, two votes?
It appeals to our sometimes contrary impulses of rugged individualism
("one person") and civic mindedness (voting). And, best of all, it appears
to be absolutely neutral with respect to geography and politics: every voter,
no matter where she lives or what she believes, gets to have her vote
weighted equally. But first impressions aside, the standard does not come
with a very impressive theoretical resume. And its supporters grossly over-
state its claim to neutrality.' 53
Despite the fact that many fundamental American institutions (the
Senate, for example) do not conform to it, the one person, one vote stan-
dard enjoys tremendous appeal among the public, politicians, and schol-
ars."' The public has accepted it wholeheartedly.' Politicians, while
initially reluctant to embrace a standard that might dispossess them of their
power, soon came to accept it'56 (or, in many cases, were soon replaced by
politicians from the newly drawn districts).'57 And scholars, with much
weeping and gnashing of teeth,' also came to positions that were roughly
in accord with the standard. Some question the necessity of requiring
153. See Hayden, supra note 4, at 226-28 (cataloging the shortcomings of the standard's claim to
neutrality).
154. See id. at 222-25. This is in marked contrast to the popular response to some of the Warren
Court's other civil-rights holdings. See Issacharoff, supra note 40, at 1657 n.72 (stating that "the appeal
of individual equality in the political process proved so strong that these decisions did not spark an
outcry similar to that arising in response to the Court's forays into the civil rights and criminal justice
areas"); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 731, 741 (1998) (claiming that, unlike some of the Warren Court's other holdings, "one person,
one vote has occasioned no backlash and seems wildly popular across the political spectrum"); Robert
B. McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 223, 224-25
(1968) (noting that the decisions were more easily accomplished than those involving race relations, the
First Amendment, and criminal justice).
155. See Guinier & Karlan, supra note 45, at 207 ("Ask the average person on the street what
democracy means and she is likely to reply 'majority rule.' Ask her what political equality means and
she is likely to reply 'one person, one vote."').
156. See id. at 211 (noting that, while in the early 1960s forty-eight of the fifty states had
legislatures with district variances of more than 15%, by the early 1970s only fourteen states had such
large variances).
157. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 (1980).
158. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative Mirror,
18 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 379-82 (2001) (documenting early opposition to the malapportionment
decisions).
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perfect adherence to the standard in a world of imperfect demographic in-
formation.'59 Some focus on the related problem of being able to bootstrap
almost any potential challenge to a redistricting plan on the back of a one
person, one vote challenge. 6 ' But few have directly questioned the wisdom
of the standard or have taken the time to explore its foundations. Instead,
critics of the standard oftentimes simply claim that there are few, if any,
compelling justifications for the rule.' 6
This is not to say that there are no arguments in favor of the one per-
son, one vote standard. The most concrete justification for the standard is
historical: it was necessary to break the stranglehold that state legislators
had over the redistricting process. Voters who lived in growing urban dis-
tricts were numerically underrepresented in Congress and state legislatures
and, consequently, received less federal and state attention.'62 The state
legislators in charge of the redistricting process were not about to redistrict
themselves out of office, and, hence, there was no political solution in
sight. Given that outlook (and sixty years of increasingly disproportionate
district populations), the judiciary stepped in, found the issue to be justici-
able, and applied the equiproportional standard. The one person, one vote
standard, then, was part of a solution to a very real problem of political
representation.
There is little to suggest, however, that perfectly equal voting districts
were a necessary part of that solution. The differences in voting power
challenged in Baker and Reynolds were on the order of twenty and forty-
one to one. 163 Such large disparities, as discussed above, had a real effect
159. See Hayden, supra note 4, at 232-33 (discussing various problems with demographic data and
criticisms of a precisely applied equiproportional rule); see also Issacharoff, supra note 40, at 1654.
160. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 778 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("More than a
decade's experience with Kirkpatrick demonstrates that insistence on precise numerical equality only
invites those who lost in the political arena to refight their battles in federal court."); Karlan, supra note
154, at 735 ("While the law requires that district populations be as equal as practicable, nobody really
sues because the congressional district to which he has been assigned has 527,472 voters while another
district has only 523,798." (footnote omitted)); Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About
Formalism, supra note 5, at 1730 (describing one person, one vote claims as "vehicle lawsuits" that are
"empty of any real content but pregnant with the possibility of persuading a court to adopt a favorable
new plan").
161. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 87 (1990) (criticizing the
redistricting decisions on the basis that the "Warren majority's new constitutional doctrine was
supported by nothing"); ELY, supra note 157, at 121 (famously noting that while the one person, one
vote standard "is certainly administrable.., the more troublesome question is what else it has to
recommend it").
162. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 48-51 (describing examples of state inaction on urban
problems); HACKER, supra note 28, at 95-99 (discussing the impact of malapportioned seats on
congressional decisions); McKAY, supra note 25, at 56-57 (describing instances where state legislatures
in Illinois, New York, and Tennessee acted in ways that disadvantaged those in the states' more
populous areas).
163. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 245 (1962)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
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on political outcomes."6 But, given the size of the disparities and the thin
theoretical arguments for numerically equivalent districts, this may have
been a case where "the Court wielding a sledgehammer helps, while a
judge applying a scalpel does only harm.' 16' The sledgehammer could have
taken the form of a blanket pronouncement that such large deviations in
district populations were not constitutionally tolerable.'66 Instead, the Court
eventually decided to dramatically narrow the range of acceptable numeri-
cal deviation and, in the case of congressional districting, to eliminate it
almost entirely.
The second, more sustaining justification offered for the one person,
one vote standard is its "neutrality" or "objectivity.' ' 67 In one sense, we
view the standard as objective because of its relationship to a majoritarian
system of democracy. 68 Deviations in relative district populations translate
quite readily into deviations from the principles of majority rule-
representatives elected by a minority of voters may make up a majority of
the governing body. The larger the deviations, the smaller the potentially
controlling minority. 169 Enforcement of the equiproportional standard is
necessary to maintain majority rule. 7 ' This assumes, of course, that we all
164. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
165. Abner J. Mikva, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Justice Brennan and the Political
Process: Assessing the Legacy of Baker v. Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 697; accord Martin Shapiro,
Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV. 227, 227-29 (1985).
166. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer points out that the early reapportionment cases provided (correctly, in
his view) just such a standard; only later did the Court become more inflexible. See Luis Fuentes-
Rohwer, Baker's Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Redistricting Revolution: A Plea for
Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353 (2002).
167. See, e.g,, Karlan, supra note 154, at 741 (describing the one person, one vote standard as the
"paradigmatic 'objective' rule" that "seem[s] to avoid the invocation of a contestable political
philosophy"); Issacharoff, supra note 40, at 1648 (noting that the Court in the 1960s considered the one
person, one vote standard to be an objective, easily managed basis for political equality).
168. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on
the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1147 (2002) (discussing the one
person, one vote standard as a "core requirement of democracy" reflected in the reapportionment
decisions).
169. Take, for example, a hypothetical state with 100,000 people divided into ten districts. If six of
the districts have 8000 people each and the other four have 13,000, the total deviation from the ideal
district size is 50%, and 48% of the state's population can, theoretically, elect a controlling majority 'in
the statehouse. If, on the other hand, the six smaller districts have 6000 people each, and the other four
districts have 16,000, the total deviation from the ideal district size is 100%, and 36% of the state's
population can elect a controlling majority in the statehouse. Of course, the relationship between the
total deviation and the size of a possible controlling majority not only depends upon the total deviation,
which only takes account of the largest and smallest district, but the population of the districts in
between as well.
170. Many of the Court's early decisions in the area actually focused on this aspect of the
reapportionment claims. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545 (1964) ("Under the existing
provisions, applying 1960 census figures, only 25.1% of the State's total population resided in districts
represented by a majority of the members of the Senate, and only 25.7% lived in counties which could
elect a majority of the members of the House of Representatives."). McKay discusses the common use
of this measure of quantitative dilution, known as the Dauer-Kelsay measure of representativeness and
its use by the Supreme Court. MCKAY, supra note 25, at 43-45. McKay also lists the minimum
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agree that some sort of pure majority rule is desirable, which, descriptively
anyway, is off the mark. It also assumes that by "majority" we mean a ma-
jority of the actual people, not the interests into which they may be
grouped.
The standard is also "objective" in the sense that it allows the courts
to avoid making subjective decisions. The Court's initial reluctance to con-
sider malapportionment claims stemmed, in large part, from the fear that
courts would be put in the position of making political judgments best re-
served to legislatures.' 7 ' Once the Court overcame its initial reluctance and
stepped into the political thicket, it was still wary of the potential that
judges would interject their own political judgments into the process-that
they would, in a sense, become quasi-dictators and usurp control of the
political system from elected representatives.' The one person, one vote
standard seemed to take such discretion out of their hands. This is what is
meant by those touting the fact that the standard is "easily managed."' 73 Its
strict application means that judges could not impose their own subjective
beliefs about the proper allocation of political power.
While the one person, one vote standard is certainly manageable and
in that sense objective, such objectivity does not get us very far. First, if the
only goal is to remove judicial discretion from the equation, the equipro-
portional standard is just one of a number of ways to determine proper rela-
tive district population.'74 For example, judges could randomize relative
district populations or accept any population within a certain, perhaps his-
torically determined, range. In either case, judicial discretion and the abil-
ity to determine political outcomes is eliminated. Second, the precise
application of the one person, one vote standard actually increases the like-
lihood that judges and not legislators will make redistricting decisions.
Quantitative vote-dilution claims are often just a vehicle for an aggrieved
party to attack an otherwise unfavorable districting plan.'75 Once the plan is
in front of a court, everything is in play since there are countless ways to
slice the population into equally sized districts. For this reason,
commentators like Richard Hasen, among others, argue that manageability
percentage of the population that can elect a majority of representatives in each of the fifty states'
legislative bodies. Id.
171. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
172. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 620 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts
were incompetent to make such decisions); see also Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of "Judicially
Unmanageable" Standards in Election Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1469, 1475-80 (2002) (detailing the judicial search for manageable standards in early reapportionment
decisions).
173. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 40, at 1648; Karlan, supra note 154, at 741.
174. See Hayden, supra note 4, at 227-28.
175. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 778 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Karlan, supra note
154, at 735; Karlan, The Rights To Vote, supra note 5, at 1730.
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is actually a vice that gets courts in the habit of intervening in political dis-
putes. 176
B. The Lack of Objectivity
Upon closer examination, the claim of objectivity is even weaker than
it seems.' In fact, when one looks at voting at its most fundamental
level-that is, as the way that voters reveal their preferences-it is difficult
to see how the standard can be justified as neutral or objective at all.
Voting involves revealing political preferences; counting votes involves
aggregating those preferences. So figuring out how much weight should be
given to a person's vote means figuring out how much weight should be
given to each person's preferences. The one person, one vote standard as-
signs equal weights to all voter preferences. But there is no ready method
of checking whether this accurately reflects the strength of those prefer-
ences. With no scale for weighing preferences, one needs to weigh them in
relation to each other, which means that one needs to make interpersonal
utility comparisons.
In discussing the relationship between preference strength and the
weight of votes, I am making what is mainly a descriptive point.' There
are many reasons why one would not want to directly tie the weight of
one's vote to the strength of her interest in an election.'79 That said, there
are many instances in which one's right to vote depends upon the strength
of one's preferences.' When it comes to the right to cast a ballot, contro-
versy often revolves around which people have sufficient interest in the
outcome of an election to allow them to vote. For example, the early prop-
erty-holding requirements and taxpaying requirements were both partially
justified on the basis that only those with a sufficient economic stake in an
176. See HASEN, supra note 4, at 47-72.
177. There may be other reasons for thinking the one person, one vote standard is not quite as
neutral as it appears. A judge may further her substantive political goals by resolving some of the
remaining doctrinal ambiguities in a way that favors particular outcomes. For example, there is not
complete agreement with respect to the relevant apportionment base (the denominator in the equation).
Is it population, voting age population, citizen voting age population, registered voters, or, if even
possible, actual voters? The choice is not without consequence, and may allow the judiciary quite a bit
of discretion. For discussion of this issue, see Hayden, supra note 4, at 231-32; Taren Stinebrickner-
Kauffman, Counting Matters: Prison Inmates, Population Bases, and "One Person, One Vote," I I VA.
J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 229 (2004); Rosanna M. Taormina, Comment, Defying One-Person, One-Vote:
Prisoners and the "Usual Residence" Principle, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (2003).
178. Hayden, supra note 4, at 248-49.
179. We would not want to undervalue the votes of minority voters who care less about the
outcome of an election because they have been excluded from the political process for so long, or
overvalue the votes of hotheads or those who are easily dissatisfied because they always feel more
strongly about the outcome of an election. See id.
180. See id. (discussing a range of voting requirements related to strength of interest); Melvyn R.
Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and Holt: Reappraising the Right to Vote in Terms of Political "Interest" and
Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1982) (stating that "'interest,' implicitly or
explicitly, must be the touchstone of the Court's analysis" of several types of voting rights cases).
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election should be allowed to vote.' 8 ' The strength of one's economic inter-
est was a proxy for the strength of one's interest in the outcome of an elec-
tion. Modem residency requirements are similarly justified, with the
underlying assumption that only those living within the geographic terri-
tory under the control of a governmental entity have enough of a stake in
that entity to vote. 8 2 Even those who question residency requirements do
not quibble with the theory that the right to vote is tied to the strength of
one's interest, just with the idea that residency is a good proxy for inter-
est. 183
The way we numerically weigh votes also correlates to the strength of
voter preferences.'84 For example, while the one person, one vote standard
applies to local governmental bodies, it only does so to those that exercise
"general governmental powers." '85 This is because we would expect such
governing bodies to affect everyone within their jurisdiction to more or less
the same degree, and we would therefore expect those people to have more
or less the same strength of preferences with regard to the choice of repre-
sentatives. The same would be true with respect to Congress or state legis-
latures, which also exercise general powers.
But what about governmental entities that do not exercise general
governmental powers? They are treated differently under the Constitution.
The Supreme Court first signaled this possibility in Avery v. Midland
County, stating:
Were the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of
government assigned the performance of functions affecting
definable groups of constituents more than other constituents, we
would have to confront the question whether such a body may be
apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens
most affected by the organization's functions.'86
181. See KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 5, 131; Hayden, supra note 4, at 249.
182. Hayden, supra note 4, at 249, 256-57; see Glenn P. Smith, Note, Interest Exceptions to One-
Resident, One-Vote: Better Results from the Voting Rights Act?, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1159 (1996)
(explaining that, in the 1960s, residency became "the sole proxy for electoral interest" and, in most
cases, it became the sole "standard for granting suffrage to qualified potential voters").
183. For instance, in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, the Court explained: "The imaginary
line defining a city's corporate limits cannot corral the influence of municipal actions. A city's
decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders." 439 U.S. 60, 69
(1978). See also Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1132 (1996) ("Boundaries exclude people who may be interested in or affected
by the decisions made within the boundaries.").
184. See Hayden, supra note 4, at 257.
185. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1969) (applying the equiproportional
standard to a junior college district); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1967) (applying
the equiproportional standard to a county government).
186. 390 U.S. at 483-84.
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The Court soon dealt with the status of such special-purpose districts
in a case involving the governing board of a California water district.'87 A
board of directors, whose members were elected by landowners (not resi-
dents), governed the water district. Their votes were weighted according to
the amount of land they owned (sort of a one acre, one vote system).188 The
Court found that, because the board's powers disproportionately affected
landowners and did so in proportion to the amount of land owned, the wa-
ter district's voting scheme was constitutionally exempt from the one per-
son, one vote requirement. 189 Thus, we allow deviations from the one
person, one vote standard when there is better information about the rela-
tive strength of people's preferences.' 90
As a descriptive matter, then, we correlate the right to vote (and to
have one's vote accorded a certain weight) to preference strength.
Applying the one person, one vote standard is partly based on the general
assumption that everyone has an equal interest in the outcome of an elec-
tion. But the assumption of equal interest is problematic because it requires
making a judgment as to the relative strength of different people's prefer-
ences, which, in turn, brings us back to the problem of making interper-
sonal utility comparisons.' 9'
As I have explained at some length in a previous Article, 92 the prob-
lem with making comparisons between different people's utility levels is
that we have no neutral or objective way to make such judgments.'93 As
Lionel Robbins recognized in the early 1930s:
There is no means of testing the magnitude of A's satisfaction as
compared with B's. If we tested the state of their blood-streams,
that would be a test of blood, not satisfaction. Introspection does
not enable A to measure what is going on in B's mind, nor B to
measure what is going on in A's. There is no way of comparing the
satisfactions of different people. '9'
187. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). Nearly a
decade later, the Court confronted another water district and reasoned in a similar way. See Ball v.
James, 451 U.S. 355 (1980).
188. Salyer, 410 U.S. at 724.
189. Id. at 729-34.
190. See Hayden, supra note 4, at 251-55.
191. Utility, for these purposes, can be equated with preference satisfaction. See id. at 236-37.
192. See id. at 236-47.
193. There are several works that give a good background to this problem. See, e.g., JAMES
GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING 113-20 (1986) (stepping through some of the more obvious problems);
INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991); Peter J.
Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They Are and Should Be Made, in
INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra, at 200, 238-54 (providing a particularly useful
bibliography).
194. LORD ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 139-
40 (3d ed. 1984) (emphasis omitted). Robbins's point was not new, see, e.g., W. STANLEY JEVONS, THE
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Robbins's point was not that there was no way of making interpersonal
comparisons, but that there was no way based on the kind of objective,
verifiable evidence that he and other economists desired.195 Without such
evidence, many economists structured their views of social welfare in ways
that avoided making such comparisons. 
196
Other philosophers and economists attempted to solve the problem by
trying to find a way to make objective interpersonal comparisons of utility.
But, in short, they failed. One way to solve the problem is to find a univer-
sal scale upon which to measure everyone's satisfaction. But no such scale
exists and, even if it did, there is no omniscient social scientist with the
ability to peer into everyone's minds and make assessments. 197 A second
way to solve the problem is to turn interpersonal comparisons into intraper-
sonal ones, which are, by most accounts, easier to compare.198 There are
several variations to this approach, but they all involve attempts to put one-
self into another's shoes in order to make a direct comparison.199
Ultimately, though, this approach fails as well, for, to the extent I can put
myself in another's shoes, there is less of "me" left to make the compari-
son.
200
THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 14 (5th ed. 1965), but it captured the minds of several generations of
political economists.
195. See RoBBINS, supra note 194, at 140-41.
196. See Martin Barrett & Daniel Hausman, Making Interpersonal Comparisons Coherently, 6
ECON. & PHIL. 293, 293 (1990). For a brief sketch of the history of the avoidance of interpersonal
utility comparisons, see Hammond, supra note 193, at 204-07. See also Amartya Sen, Social Choice
Theory, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 1073 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D.
Intriligator eds., .1986) (providing a useful survey of the literature of social choice theory without
interpersonal comparisons).
197. See Hayden, supra note 4, at 245; Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal
Utility Comparisons-A Reply, 106 MIND 99, 99 (1997).
198. See Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 104 MIND
415, 477-78 (1995); Alfred F. MacKay, Extended Sympathy and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 83
J. PHIL. 305, 305-06 (1986).
199. Alfred MacKay terms such attempts the "mental shoehorn maneuver." MacKay, supra note
198, at 305. See also R. M. HARE, MORAL THINKING 87-106, 117-29 (1981); JOHN C. HARSANYI,
RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 58-59
(1977); Kenneth J. Arrow, Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice, 67 AM. ECON.
REV. 219, 223-37 (1978); John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, 44 Soc.
RES. 638 (1977). Arrow, however, admits that there are some lurking problems in the approach:
[l]f your satisfaction depends on some inner qualities that I do not possess, then I really have
not had the experience which will enable me to judge the satisfaction one would derive from
that quality in association with some distribution of goods. Hence, my judgment has a
probability element in it and therefore will not agree with yourjudgment.
Kenneth J. Arrow, Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice, 7 PHILOSOPHIA 223, 236
(1978). There are, of course, other adherents. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 14-
15 (1973); Donald Davidson, Judging Interpersonal Interests, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE
THEORY 195 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986).
200. See MacKay, supra note 198, at 321-22; see also James Griffin, Against the Taste Model, in
INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 193, at 45, 52-59.
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The lesson, though, is not that objective interpersonal utility compari-
sons cannot be made, but that they necessarily involve normative deci-
sions.20' In other words, when one assigns weight to a person's preferences,
one makes some fundamental value judgments. Similarly, there is no ob-
jective standard of quantitative vote dilution that ties the weight of each
person's vote to the intensity of her preference.2 °2 The one person, one vote
standard has no greater claim to this sort of neutrality than any other stan-
dard, for we have no objective reason for thinking that everyone within a
certain jurisdiction has identically strong preferences with respect to the
outcome of an election.20 3 It involves the same sort of normative considera-
tions at issue in the access cases and, more to the point, in the qualitative
vote-dilution cases.20 4
The fact that the one person, one vote standard involves a normative
judgment should not be that controversial. The Justices who dissented from
the original malapportionment cases made a similar point.205 Academics,
too, recognized that the standard was a normative one.206 Despite that rec-
ognition, we have not reexamined the standard with an eye to solving cur-
rent problems in minority vote dilution. But its essentially normative
character makes it fair game when it comes to tinkering with democratic
institutions. And, it may provide a key to resolving the dilemma of minor-
ity representation.
III
RESOLVING THE DILEMMA OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION
A. A Partial Solution
Once we get over the illusion that the one person, one vote standard is
neutral or objective, the right to cast a ballot free from quantitative vote
dilution begins to look a lot like other aspects of voting rights. This is es-
pecially true when we recognize that departures from perfect equality can
already be justified by respect for existing political subdivisions, communi-
ties of interest, and other factors.20 7 Assigning the correct numerical weight
to votes involves making the same normative decisions as granting access
201. See JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS: EQUALITY, UNCERTAINTY AND TIME 220 (1991);
GRIFFIN, supra note 193, at 119-20; Hammond, supra note 193, at 226, 236-37; Hayden, supra note 4,
at 246-47; Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons, in INTERPERSONAL
COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 193, at 17, 18, 44.
202. See Hayden, supra note 4, at 247-51.
203. See id. at 251-52.
204. See id. at 255-61.
205. See, e.g., Baker v. CarT, 369 U.S. 186, 268 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (speaking of
the "incommensurable factors of policy that underlie these mathematical puzzles").
206. See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 4, at 21-25.
207. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740-41 (1983); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
577-81 (1964).
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to the polls, 2°8 or deciding to draw district lines in a way that maximizes or
minimizes the voting power of a particular group.29 This has many possi-
ble implications for the way voting rights should be legally structured.
Treating one person, one vote claims like other voting-rights claims
could take us in one of three directions when it comes to judicial involve-
ment in voting rights. First, one could argue that courts should be allowed
more freedom to intervene in and decide voting-rights controversies. The
argument here would be that we have already allowed courts, without
much of a pretext, to make substantive political decisions in the one per-
son, one vote cases. Allowing more intervention in the access and gerry-
mandering cases really is not granting courts a qualitatively different role
in the political process. Second, one could go the other way on the question
of judicial involvement and say that this is an argument for the courts to
get out of the business of voting rights in all but the most extreme cases.
Justice Frankfurter was right in more ways than one when he said that the
malapportionment cases involved a step into the political thicket. l
Initially, the decision to hear quantitative vote-dilution claims involved
normative political judgments. Moreover, it opened the door with respect
to other, more judicially invasive forays into the types of decisions usually
reserved for legislatures (as Hasen put it, Reynolds v. Sims begat Bush v.
Gore).2 11 The one person, one vote claims ended up serving as a pretext for
court involvement in qualitative vote-dilution decisions, which, in an even
more transparent way, involved substantive political decisions. 12 Thus, one
could argue that courts should step back from the original one person, one
vote cases, or at least apply the standard in a more flexible fashion. This
would get courts out of the business of making political judgments that
they are so ill-equipped to make. Finally, we could also argue for taking a
middle path, one allowing judicial involvement in some types of voting
rights cases and, once the judges are in, give them a freer hand to devise
remedies.2t 3
208. See Hayden, supra note 4, at 255-6 1.
209. See id. at 259-6 1.
210. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
211. Richard L. Hasen, A "Tincture of Justice ": Judge Posner 's Failed Rehabilitation of Bush v.
Gore, 80 TEX. L. REV. 137, 154 (2001) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK:
THE 2OOO ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001)).
212. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 778 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Karlan, supra note
154, at 735; Karlan, The Rights To Vote, supra note 5, at 1730.
213. This increased freedom would help recapture the rationales for judicial intervention found in
the Carolene Products footnote from the partisan interests that have commandeered them for their own
purposes. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Nate Persily
persuasively describes the cooption of these prominority and anti-entrenchment rationales in the service
of normal partisan conflict. See Persily, supra note 129, at 610-12. Relaxing the application of the one
person, one vote standard in all contexts (which I support, but is not the central thesis of this Article)
would help remove it from the parties' general litigation arsenals. As discussed below, the proposal in
this Article would not quite do that, but it would redirect aspects of the one person, one vote law in the
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The three types of voting-rights claims involve the same sorts of nor-
mative issues and should therefore be viewed more interchangeably.
Because of the Court's role in checking a potentially tyrannical majority,
one area ripe for this type of judicial intervention is that of minority voting
rights. Here, a relaxation of the one person, one vote standard can lead us
out of the representation dilemma faced by minority voters.1 4
Our previous conclusions can now help us move forward. We already
know that strict adherence to the one person, one vote standard is one of
the necessary conditions for the dilemma faced by minority-voting-rights
advocates. We also know that such quantitative claims involve decisions
that are every bit as normative as those found in other types of voting
rights claims. That said, when faced with a qualitative minority-vote-
dilution claim, legislatures and, if necessary, courts should be able to ma-
nipulate both the shape and the relative population of the district in order
to strengthen minority political participation. In the context of minority-
vote-dilution claims, in addition to redrawing district lines in a way that
creates majority-minority districts, we could allow plaintiffs to propose
(and courts to approve) remedial plans that reduce the numerical size of
those districts to further concentrate minority voting power. This would
give voting rights plaintiffs additional tools to use in their quest for more
effective participation.
Let us revisit the simplified example used earlier to demonstrate how
this could be done.2 '5 In that example, remember, District A and District B
each had 100,000 voters composed of 35,000 black voters and 65,000
white voters. Black voters supported Democrats over Republicans at a ratio
of 90% to 10%; white voters supported Republicans over Democrats at a
ratio of 60% to 40%. As a result, both districts sent a white Democrat to
the legislature. The creation of a majority-minority district allowed those in
a redrawn District A to elect a black Democrat, but at the cost of electing a
Republican in District B. Hence, there is a tradeoff between descriptive and
substantive representation.
But without the constraints of the one person, one vote standard, one
can create a majority-minority district without losing much in the way of
substantive representation. For example, District A could be redrawn as a
much smaller majority-minority district-say with a population of 50,000,
with 30,000 black voters and 20,000 white voters. Such a district, as in the
first example, would elect a black Democrat, this time by a margin of
service of those discrete and insular minorities about whom the Carolene Products Court was
concerned.
214. See Hayden, supra note 4, at 264-65 (noting the possibility of reducing the population of
majority-minority districts to numerically concentrate minority voting strength); GROFMAN ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 110-11 (discussing the relationship between the equal population requirement and
minority representation).
215. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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35,000 to 15,000.216 This leaves District B with 150,000 voters: 40,000
black and 110,000 white. District B, though, unlike the last example,
would again elect a white Democrat, now by a margin of 80,000 to
70,000.17 The freedom to manipulate district population, along with dis-
trict shape, would allow a court (or the DOJ) to remedy a case of qualita-
tive vote dilution without the attendant loss of substantive representation.
This example, with its resulting three-to-one population disparity,
may seem a bit extreme, but the point it makes is not. To begin with, one
should recognize that some of our most hallowed democratic institutions,
such as the U.S. Senate, give rise to much larger differences in voting
power." 8 There are many reasons, beyond the one dealt with here, for re-
thinking the precise adherence to the one person, one vote standard re-
quired of congressional districts.21 9 And, as mentioned above, we usually
allow state and local districts to deviate up to 10% from the standard with-
out question, and even more if suitably justified.2 ° Chief among the rea-
sons currently used to justify higher deviations is the maintenance of
existing district lines-lines that, as Richard Ford has persuasively argued,
are already strongly informed by race. 2 ' Given all of this, allowing devia-
tions from the one person, one vote standard in order to more effectively
remedy the dilution of minority voting power is a perfectly appropriate
solution.
Despite the fact that the one person, one vote standard is well en-
trenched in the popular imagination, it may also be the solution that in-
volves the smallest amount of legal change. Three somewhat related
changes would need to occur, all three of which have justifications com-
pletely independent from the issue of minority vote dilution. First, the
Supreme Court would need to back out of the line of cases holding that
congressional districts within the same state must be perfectly equipropor-
tional. This would not mean going back on the reasoning of Baker v.
216. The 35,000 figure for the Democrats comes from 90% of 30,000 black voters (27,000) plus
40% of 20,000 white voters (8000).
217. The 80,000 figure for the Democrats comes from 90% of 40,000 black voters (36,000) plus
40% of 110,000 white voters (44,000).
218. Under our constitutional structure, the two senators from Wyoming represent 495,304 people
while the two from California represent 33,930,798. See KAREN M. MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT 2 tbl. I (July 2001). For some critiques of this aspect of the Senate,
see ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 46-54 (2002); Suzanna
Sherry, Our Unconstitutional Senate, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES
95 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
219. They have been criticized for, among other things, using the wrong apportionment base,
having their precise tolerances swamped by imperfections in census data, and doing little to ensure
equal political opportunity. See Hayden, supra note 4, at 230-34.
220. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
221. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994).
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Carr, nor would it mean tossing out Wesberry v. Sanders. 3
Congressional districts would still be held to the one person, one vote
standard-they would just be allowed a greater degree of variation, one
that comports with the imprecision in census data, the existing differences
between districts in different states," 4 and more effectively resolving mi-
nority vote dilution.225
Second, along with backing away from strict application of the stan-
dard, we would need to allow states, the DOJ, or courts to use the problem
of minority representation discussed in this article to justify deviations
from the one person, one vote standard. In the case of state legislative dis-
tricts, this would mean just adding it to the list of acceptable reasons for a
deviation. For congressional districts it would require creating a meaning-
ful list and making this item the first on the list (though, one hopes, not the
last). While the Court has made clear that some consistently applied legis-
lative policies might justify small deviations in a voting district's popula-
tion,226 it expressly reserved the question of whether preserving minority
voting strength is one of those policies. 227 Thus, the general structure for
this aspect of the solution already exists in the area of state reapportion-
ment decisions; the precise details involving the maximum allowable de-
viation for such purposes can be based on the problem that racial
redistricting is designed to solve.
The final hurdle is also constitutional and involves the Shaw line of
cases.228 Reducing district relative population in order to numerically con-
centrate minority voting power may run afoul of Shaw and, more directly,
Miller v. Johnson's proscriptions against allowing race to predominate dis-
tricting decisions.2 9 But, again, the analysis here should not be any
222. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (finding differences in state legislative district sizes to be a justiciable
issue).
223. 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying the one person, one vote standard to congressional districts).
224. The constitutional requirement that representatives be apportioned among the several states
means that congressional districts do not cross state lines. From this, it follows that the Court's standard
of "precise mathematical equality" only applies to districts within a single state. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U.S. 526, 530-1 (1969). After the most recent round of redistricting, this, coupled with the one-
representative per state minimum, means that while the congressional district in Wyoming has a
population of 495,304, the one in Montana has 905,316. See Mills, supra note 218, at 1, 4. The average
district size is 646,952. Id. at 1.
225. There are all sorts of reasons for relaxing application of the one person, one vote standard,
especially in light of some of the Supreme Court's other voting-rights decisions. See Grant M. Hayden,
The Supreme Court and Voting Rights: An Incomplete Exit Strategy, 83 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
May 2005).
226. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740-41 (1983).
227. See id. at 742-43 & n. 12.
228. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding that districts may violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution if race was the predominant factor in their creation); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that irregularly shaped districts can, on their face, violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution).
229. See Miller, 515 U.S. 900.
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different than in the gerrymandering cases. That is, manipulating district
relative population should not be subject to any higher standard than ma-
nipulating district shape. There are many other possible considerations-
such as protecting incumbents, maximizing party control, and maintaining
existing governmental boundaries-that would provide additional reasons
for any decision to reduce or increase district relative population. The
Supreme Court, as of late, appears to be more willing to allow that these
other considerations may have as much to do with a redistricting decision
as race.23° Thus, though this solution of loosening up the one person, one
vote standard may sound somewhat extreme, it would not involve anything
close to a complete reworking of our majoritarian democratic structures
(like cumulative voting) or even significantly revamping existing voting-
rights law.
B. Responses to Possible Objections
Although this solution does not demand a radical change in the coun-
try's democratic structures (or even most of its voting rights laws), it does
require revising the right to an equally weighted vote. Like any revision of
a well-established norm, it gives rise to a host of complicated issues. First,
by demanding the creation of smaller majority-minority or coalition dis-
tricts, the solution assigns greater weight to minority votes in what appears
to be a rather crude form of affirmative action: it straightforwardly gives
blacks and Hispanics more numerical voting power than whites. Second,
unlike equipopulous racial gerrymandering, which is cabined by both geog-
raphy and constitutional doctrine, the quantitative improvement of voting
power lacks obvious limits. One can imagine devising smaller and smaller
districts in order to further concentrate minority voting power. Third, the
solution may give rise to new forms of partisan manipulation that are dam-
aging in their own right or, at a minimum, thwart the goal of remedying
minority vote dilution. Fourth, and finally, the sheer inertia of the one per-
son, one vote standard may stand in the way of judicial acceptance of the
solution.
Given the chilly reception offered to racial gerrymanders that qualita-
tively concentrated minority voting power, one can only imagine the outcry
at quantitatively concentrating minority voting power as well. The solution
does involve a form of affirmative action, as it proposes race-conscious
alteration of district relative population in order to concentrate minority
voting power. And affirmative action in the context of voting rights seems
more troubling than in other areas, such as school admissions or employ-
ment, in that it involves tinkering with what it means to be a member of a
political majority or minority.
230. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (sustaining redistricting, based partially on
race, because other factors were at play in the decision).
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But this solution should not add any more fuel to the flame of the af-
firmative action debate. While it is true that we do not currently manipulate
the relative population of districts (and quantitatively concentrate voting
power) to further the goal of effective minority representation, we do ma-
nipulate the shape (and qualitatively concentrate it). And, as I have argued
here and elsewhere,23' quantitative and qualitative concentration and dilu-
tion involve the same sort of normative considerations. One can affect the
outcome of an election by assigning votes different weights or by combin-
ing votes in different ways. Both aspects of the right to vote involve the
manipulation of group voting power. In other words, the issue here should
not be any different than the issue with respect to the racial gerrymanders
that give rise to majority-minority or coalition districts. While manipulat-
ing the relative population of districts may renew the debate over affirma-
tive action in voting rights, the only real change would be in the tone, not
the substance, of the debate.
One should also remember that the numerical concentration of voting
power is only proposed in anticipation (or as a remedy) to a vote-dilution
claim under section 2 or to prevent retrogression under section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. Congress made the decision to concentrate on the rights
of racial and language minorities. And Congress made this decision in or-
der to realize the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment. The solution,
then, does not randomly select minority groups for some sort of special
treatment; instead, it helps fulfill the constitutional promise of voting
equality and satisfy the legislation designed to enforce it.
Allowing states to comply with (and courts to enforce) the dictates of
the Voting Rights Act by manipulating the relative population of districts
does not substantively enlarge the scope of the injury that the Act is de-
signed to remedy-it just adds another way of ensuring compliance. This is
so despite the fact that it would increase the number of situations in which
actionable vote dilution could be found (and would do so without the rep-
resentational costs discussed above). Take, for example, a vote-dilution
claim under section 2 of the Act. Members of a protected minority group
need to show that they have "less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice. 23 2 They can make this showing by proving that (1) they
are sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district, (2) they are politically cohesive, and (3) the
majority votes as a bloc in such a way that it usually defeats the minority's
preferred candidate.2 3  The second two prongs map out the legal injury, and
I do not think my proposal has any direct effect on them. It does affect the
231. Hayden, supra note 4, at 254-61.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000).
233. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
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first prong, in that it would allow plaintiffs to demonstrate that they consti-
tute a majority in a district with a smaller population (up to some limit).
But this first prong, when coupled with the second, mainly serves to map
out the remedy, not the injury. Thus, the proposal does not involve much
more than identifying potential vote dilution under current standards and
then allowing the manipulation of district relative population as a remedy.
A second potential shortcoming of my solution is that it lacks appre-
ciable limits. The primary remedy for qualitative vote-dilution claims-
redrawing district lines to form majority-minority or coalition districts-
has some built-in limitations. Initially, the requirement that election dis-
tricts be contiguous, coupled with the geographic distribution of blacks and
Hispanics, places an upper limit on the number of majority-minority dis-
tricts that can be drawn. And, as seen earlier, the reapportionments of the
1990s came quite close to those limits. In addition, the Supreme Court
placed an additional check on district shape in Shaw, finding a constitu-
tional violation when a district shape is so bizarre that it cannot be ex-
plained by anything other than race. Though the Court later clarified that
district shape was more of an evidentiary matter than a strict substantive
rule, shape restrictions still place limits on the number of majority-minority
districts. And, of course, the one person, one vote requirement also func-
tions to control the number of minority districts.
But once the one person, one vote standard is relaxed in this context,
there is no obvious limit to the number of majority-minority districts that
could be drawn. In a move that could make the "max-black" push of the
1990s look like child's play, one could theoretically litter the political
landscape with very small districts with relatively large minority popula-
tions. Minority-preferred candidates could dominate Congress and state
legislatures. Even though shrinking majority-minority districts would only
occur in anticipation of or as a remedy for a claim under the Voting Rights
Act, it is sometimes hard to separate remedy from harm in voting-rights
cases. The three-pronged test in Gingles, remember, encapsulated both in-
jury and remedy and effectively gave minority plaintiffs a cause of action
under section 2 whenever there was racial bloc voting and they could be
drawn into a compact majority-minority district. Thus the obvious ques-
tion: Where would we draw the line when it came to disparities in district
population?
As in the current qualitative vote-dilution cases, this is a question for
which there is no simple answer. It instead appears to be one of those areas
where, in the absence of a clear consensus, it would be best for the Court to
give legislatures (and lower courts) the doctrinal flexibility and the time to
slowly develop an answer rather than rushing to draw some bright-line
outer limit that may prove unworkable in the long run. So while there are
no easy answers, there may be some obvious starting points that could be
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used to rough out the outer boundaries of acceptable district relative popu-
lation.
For example, in the case of congressional districts, one could set the
limits at the smallest and largest district populations dictated by the consti-
tutional requirement that districts not cross state lines.234 That requirement
currently means that while the average population of congressional districts
is 646,952, the population of the district in the state of Wyoming is
495,304.235 Thus, the population in the least-populous state could be used
to set a minimum for district population in states with more districting
flexibility. The maximum district population could be set in the same way,
with Montana's 905,316 setting the upper limit. 236 These types of bounda-
ries would ensure that any new, smaller minority districts would not cause
numerical dilution that is much out of line with that currently caused by
Wyoming. Within those outer boundaries, one could additionally use a test
of rough proportionality to limit the number or relative population of
majority-minority districts. In a state with ten congressional seats where
blacks make up 28% of the population, for example, drawing more than
three majority-black districts may lead to some level of constitutional sus-
picion.
The point here is not that there is a clear lower limit to acceptable dis-
trict population, but that the issues are not qualitatively different than those
in the current debate over racial gerrymandering. While that may not warm
the hearts of those familiar with the Supreme Court's slipshod voting rights
jurisprudence, it should not add any additional chill. Both redrawing dis-
trict lines and changing relative district population involve making substan-
tive political decisions. And, in light of the normative character of the one
person, one vote standard, that is exactly what we should expect.
A third potential drawback to the proposed solution is that it will be
subject to partisan manipulation. In addition to being able to gerrymander
the shape of districts in order to advantage their political fortunes, parties
would again be able to play with relative district population as well. The
mere possibility of being able to tinker with relative district population
should be enough to make any political operative salivate, and perhaps that
should make us somewhat wary of instituting such a change.
While it is clear that loosening the one person, one vote standard-
even in the limited circumstances of minority vote dilution-would give
political parties additional opportunities to advance their own interests, this
would be true of almost any change in the laws governing elections. The
question then becomes not whether, but how, parties will likely respond to
this change. And, while predicting the form and effect of party behavior is
234. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
235. See MILLS, supra note 218, at 1,4.
236. See id. at 4.
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quite difficult, there are some reasons to believe that this proposal would
be well worth the cost of any additional partisan manipulation.
The most obvious effect would be to realign the political philosophies
of the two main political parties with their own self-interests. Democrats
would be in a position to push for additional majority-minority districts
without sacrificing Democratic seats; Republicans would, in all likelihood,
oppose such districts. Both parties could pursue their own electoral self-
interest without fear of contradicting their stated ideology on matters of
race.
Such a realignment of party self-interest with party ideology is not
necessarily desirable. Perhaps it is useful to have a system that extracts
some political cost when parties engage in racial gerrymanders that benefit
their candidates. Aligning the interests of Republicans with those of many
minority groups may provide some additional political capital to minority
incumbents. It may even change some people's minds, one way or another,
about the value of race-conscious legislation. If nothing else, the current
system may simply provide a check on the incentives of both parties to
manipulate the system. Perhaps this works in favor of minority-voting-
rights advocates, who may be able to form alliances with both major par-
ties: the Democrats for ideological reasons, the Republicans for self-
interested ones. Both political parties have something to gain by supporting
the creation of majority-minority districts.
But both have something to lose as well. Democrats may reap some
political gain by catering to the interests of some of their most loyal sup-
porters, but may ultimately lose some legislative seats. Republicans may
gain some seats, but may also alienate some of their supporters by throw-
ing their weight behind race-conscious legislation. Neither party has an
unconflicted interest that matches up with that of minority voters. For ex-
ample, Democrats in Georgia, including black incumbents from newly
drawn majority-minority districts, closed ranks in their most recent round
of redistricting to undermine the strength of some majority-minority dis-
tricts. And leaving Republicans in charge of championing minority inter-
ests under the Voting Rights Act is clearly leaving the fox in charge of the
henhouse. Neither party is neutral, even on the issue of solving minority
vote dilution for its own sake, and that may be a problem any time party
interests and minority voter interests diverge. It may be better for minority
voters, then, to line up at least one of the parties' ideologies with its self-
interest.
Of the two parties, the Democrats would be clear beneficiaries of a
relaxation of the equiproportional rule. Newly created majority-minority
districts would not necessarily deprive surrounding districts of reliably
Democratic voters. Minority districts could therefore be created without
representational costs to Democrats. This result, however, should not be
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surprising. The Voting Rights Act was created to ensure that minority vot-
ers could fully participate in the political system. Those voters overwhelm-
ingly support Democratic candidates. The fact that a remedy for minority
vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act favors the interests of the
Democratic party, therefore, should be expected. It certainly makes more
sense than one that has an effect of helping Republicans.
A more general concern is that parties may be able to manipulate rela-
tive district population in a way that leads to the kind of political en-
trenchment that Baker and its progeny were designed to eliminate. That is,
a party or faction would use this as an opening to seize control of Congress
or a state legislature and lock up the political system. This, in turn, would
give rise to all of the negative consequences that flowed from the malap-
portionment of the first half of the twentieth century.
But there is little likelihood that merely relaxing the one person, one
vote standard in the context of minority vote dilution would lead us back to
those pre-Baker variations in relative district population. Relaxing the stan-
dard is not eliminating the standard: the one person, one vote norm would
still be the benchmark and deviations from that norm would need to be
suitably justified. As discussed above, the Court could establish outside
limits to maximum deviation from the norm. Even allowing differences in
numerical voting power of up to two to one would allow much more dis-
tricting flexibility without coming close to the differences at issue in Baker
(twenty to one) and Reynolds (forty-one to one). Thus, while it may be im-
possible to predict all possible unintended consequences of such a move,
there seems to be a sufficient backstop in place to prevent the type of redis-
tricting problems that plagued the pre-Baker political landscape.
A final hurdle in implementing the proposed solution is not legal or
political, but more social and psychological. Given the popularity of the
one person, one vote standard, is it even conceivable that we could, for any
reason, pull back from it? For example, Hasen argues:
[N]othing now formally prevents the Court from backpedaling
from a decisive standard like the one person, one vote
standard,.... [M]y sense is that a move from a mushy
unmanageable standard to a more manageable standard is easier for
the Court than to overrule existing precedent or even to make an
unannounced switch from a firm manageable standard to
mushiness.237
And while giving credence to this type of argument appears to stand in the
way of almost any legal change, there must be some appreciation of
whether a proposal is even within the realm of the possible.
There are several reasons to think that allowing the numerical concen-
tration of minority voting power is a realistic answer to some of the issues
237. HASEN, supra note 4, at 119.
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of minority vote dilution. I do not propose eliminating the one person, one
vote standard as one of the benchmarks of political equality. Instead, the
solution here only involves relaxing the application of the standard in a
way that comports with the structure of existing voting-rights law. Thus,
this is not a call to eliminate one person, one vote from our political vo-
cabulary, but to assign it a more nuanced role in recognition of its essen-
tially normative character.
Nor would such a move be likely to spark widespread resentment. For
example, there is already plenty of judicial and academic grumbling about
the precise tolerances built into the Court's application of the one person,
one vote standard. Although it is clear that the public has wholeheartedly
embraced the one person, one vote slogan, there is little reason to believe
that it would be upset by a relaxation of the standard. Nobody seems too
upset by the enormous differences in voting power presented by the Senate,
much less about the differences engendered by the fact that congressional
districts do not cross state lines. And, after the dust cleared in the 2000
presidential election controversy, most people did not seem to mind that
the electoral college resulted in the election of a candidate with half a mil-
lion fewer votes than his opponent. Thus, despite the popularity of the one
person, one vote standard, there is no reason to believe that strict adherence
to it is so firmly entrenched in judicial philosophy or public consciousness
to render the proposed solution a nonstarter.
CONCLUSION
The dilemma of minority representation has a very real effect on the
way our democracy functions. It explains why there has been a limit to the
number of black and Hispanic representatives elected. It explains how the
quest to increase minority representation contributed, somewhat per-
versely, to the rising fortunes of the Republican candidates through the
1990s. And it represents the next, though assuredly not the last, major chal-
lenge in the field of minority voting rights.
The dilemma is the result of many historical and demographic forces.
Members of racial minority groups overwhelmingly support Democratic
candidates, whites increasingly support Republicans, and the racial divide
in politics is growing. While that situation, and the underlying problem of
race in this country that it represents, does not lend itself to a ready legal
solution, there are other grounds for the dilemma that may be more easily
remedied. Chief among these is the slavish adherence to the one person,
one vote standard, which, both literally and figuratively, makes the creation
of majority-minority districts a zero-sum game.
Allowing departures from the one person, one vote standard in the
remedy phase of minority-vote-dilution cases would remove one of the
necessary conditions of the representation dilemma. It would allow the
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DOJ and the courts to create majority-minority districts, and therefore in-
crease descriptive representation without substantively penalizing minority
voters. And, in doing so, it would resolve the most pressing issue in this
"Second Reconstruction": the dilemma of minority representation.
